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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/net/esp.h
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/net/esp.h')
-rw-r--r--include/net/esp.h50
1 files changed, 50 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/net/esp.h b/include/net/esp.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..322950727
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/net/esp.h
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _NET_ESP_H
+#define _NET_ESP_H
+
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+
+struct ip_esp_hdr;
+struct xfrm_state;
+
+static inline struct ip_esp_hdr *ip_esp_hdr(const struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ return (struct ip_esp_hdr *)skb_transport_header(skb);
+}
+
+static inline void esp_output_fill_trailer(u8 *tail, int tfclen, int plen, __u8 proto)
+{
+ /* Fill padding... */
+ if (tfclen) {
+ memset(tail, 0, tfclen);
+ tail += tfclen;
+ }
+ do {
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < plen - 2; i++)
+ tail[i] = i + 1;
+ } while (0);
+ tail[plen - 2] = plen - 2;
+ tail[plen - 1] = proto;
+}
+
+struct esp_info {
+ struct ip_esp_hdr *esph;
+ __be64 seqno;
+ int tfclen;
+ int tailen;
+ int plen;
+ int clen;
+ int len;
+ int nfrags;
+ __u8 proto;
+ bool inplace;
+};
+
+int esp_output_head(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb, struct esp_info *esp);
+int esp_output_tail(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb, struct esp_info *esp);
+int esp_input_done2(struct sk_buff *skb, int err);
+int esp6_output_head(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb, struct esp_info *esp);
+int esp6_output_tail(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb, struct esp_info *esp);
+int esp6_input_done2(struct sk_buff *skb, int err);
+#endif