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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/net/dst_ops.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/net/dst_ops.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/net/dst_ops.h | 73 |
1 files changed, 73 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/net/dst_ops.h b/include/net/dst_ops.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3a9001a04 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/net/dst_ops.h @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef _NET_DST_OPS_H +#define _NET_DST_OPS_H +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/percpu_counter.h> +#include <linux/cache.h> + +struct dst_entry; +struct kmem_cachep; +struct net_device; +struct sk_buff; +struct sock; +struct net; + +struct dst_ops { + unsigned short family; + unsigned int gc_thresh; + + void (*gc)(struct dst_ops *ops); + struct dst_entry * (*check)(struct dst_entry *, __u32 cookie); + unsigned int (*default_advmss)(const struct dst_entry *); + unsigned int (*mtu)(const struct dst_entry *); + u32 * (*cow_metrics)(struct dst_entry *, unsigned long); + void (*destroy)(struct dst_entry *); + void (*ifdown)(struct dst_entry *, + struct net_device *dev); + void (*negative_advice)(struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *); + void (*link_failure)(struct sk_buff *); + void (*update_pmtu)(struct dst_entry *dst, struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb, u32 mtu, + bool confirm_neigh); + void (*redirect)(struct dst_entry *dst, struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb); + int (*local_out)(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); + struct neighbour * (*neigh_lookup)(const struct dst_entry *dst, + struct sk_buff *skb, + const void *daddr); + void (*confirm_neigh)(const struct dst_entry *dst, + const void *daddr); + + struct kmem_cache *kmem_cachep; + + struct percpu_counter pcpuc_entries ____cacheline_aligned_in_smp; +}; + +static inline int dst_entries_get_fast(struct dst_ops *dst) +{ + return percpu_counter_read_positive(&dst->pcpuc_entries); +} + +static inline int dst_entries_get_slow(struct dst_ops *dst) +{ + return percpu_counter_sum_positive(&dst->pcpuc_entries); +} + +#define DST_PERCPU_COUNTER_BATCH 32 +static inline void dst_entries_add(struct dst_ops *dst, int val) +{ + percpu_counter_add_batch(&dst->pcpuc_entries, val, + DST_PERCPU_COUNTER_BATCH); +} + +static inline int dst_entries_init(struct dst_ops *dst) +{ + return percpu_counter_init(&dst->pcpuc_entries, 0, GFP_KERNEL); +} + +static inline void dst_entries_destroy(struct dst_ops *dst) +{ + percpu_counter_destroy(&dst->pcpuc_entries); +} + +#endif |
