openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted

sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.

    l.lwz   r29,0(r4)
    l.lwz   r27,0(r5)
    l.sw    0(r4),r27
    l.sw    0(r5),r29

The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.

A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.

This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.

Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.

[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>

1 files changed, 88 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/include/net/cls_cgroup.h b/include/net/cls_cgroup.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..668aeee9b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/net/cls_cgroup.h
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
+/*
+ * cls_cgroup.h			Control Group Classifier
+ *
+ * Authors:	Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
+ */
+
+#ifndef _NET_CLS_CGROUP_H
+#define _NET_CLS_CGROUP_H
+
+#include <linux/cgroup.h>
+#include <linux/hardirq.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <net/inet_sock.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_NET_CLASSID
+struct cgroup_cls_state {
+	struct cgroup_subsys_state css;
+	u32 classid;
+};
+
+struct cgroup_cls_state *task_cls_state(struct task_struct *p);
+
+static inline u32 task_cls_classid(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	u32 classid;
+
+	if (in_interrupt())
+		return 0;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	classid = container_of(task_css(p, net_cls_cgrp_id),
+			       struct cgroup_cls_state, css)->classid;
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return classid;
+}
+
+static inline void sock_update_classid(struct sock_cgroup_data *skcd)
+{
+	u32 classid;
+
+	classid = task_cls_classid(current);
+	sock_cgroup_set_classid(skcd, classid);
+}
+
+static inline u32 __task_get_classid(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	return task_cls_state(task)->classid;
+}
+
+static inline u32 task_get_classid(const struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	u32 classid = __task_get_classid(current);
+
+	/* Due to the nature of the classifier it is required to ignore all
+	 * packets originating from softirq context as accessing `current'
+	 * would lead to false results.
+	 *
+	 * This test assumes that all callers of dev_queue_xmit() explicitly
+	 * disable bh. Knowing this, it is possible to detect softirq based
+	 * calls by looking at the number of nested bh disable calls because
+	 * softirqs always disables bh.
+	 */
+	if (softirq_count()) {
+		struct sock *sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
+
+		/* If there is an sock_cgroup_classid we'll use that. */
+		if (!sk || !sk_fullsock(sk))
+			return 0;
+
+		classid = sock_cgroup_classid(&sk->sk_cgrp_data);
+	}
+
+	return classid;
+}
+#else /* !CONFIG_CGROUP_NET_CLASSID */
+static inline void sock_update_classid(struct sock_cgroup_data *skcd)
+{
+}
+
+static inline u32 task_get_classid(const struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_CGROUP_NET_CLASSID */
+#endif  /* _NET_CLS_CGROUP_H */