staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 28 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/include/net/can.h b/include/net/can.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6db9e826f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/net/can.h
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) */
+/*
+ * net/can.h
+ *
+ * Definitions for the CAN network socket buffer extensions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2026 Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _NET_CAN_H
+#define _NET_CAN_H
+
+/**
+ * struct can_skb_ext - skb extensions for CAN specific content
+ * @can_iif: ifindex of the first interface the CAN frame appeared on
+ * @can_framelen: cached echo CAN frame length for bql
+ * @can_gw_hops: can-gw CAN frame time-to-live counter
+ * @can_ext_flags: CAN skb extensions flags
+ */
+struct can_skb_ext {
+	int	can_iif;
+	u16	can_framelen;
+	u8	can_gw_hops;
+	u8	can_ext_flags;
+};
+
+#endif /* _NET_CAN_H */