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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/net/arp.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/net/arp.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/net/arp.h | 77 |
1 files changed, 77 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/net/arp.h b/include/net/arp.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e8747e071 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/net/arp.h @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* linux/net/inet/arp.h */ +#ifndef _ARP_H +#define _ARP_H + +#include <linux/if_arp.h> +#include <linux/hash.h> +#include <net/neighbour.h> + + +extern struct neigh_table arp_tbl; + +static inline u32 arp_hashfn(const void *pkey, const struct net_device *dev, u32 *hash_rnd) +{ + u32 key = *(const u32 *)pkey; + u32 val = key ^ hash32_ptr(dev); + + return val * hash_rnd[0]; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_INET +static inline struct neighbour *__ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref(struct net_device *dev, u32 key) +{ + if (dev->flags & (IFF_LOOPBACK | IFF_POINTOPOINT)) + key = INADDR_ANY; + + return ___neigh_lookup_noref(&arp_tbl, neigh_key_eq32, arp_hashfn, &key, dev); +} +#else +static inline +struct neighbour *__ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref(struct net_device *dev, u32 key) +{ + return NULL; +} +#endif + +static inline struct neighbour *__ipv4_neigh_lookup(struct net_device *dev, u32 key) +{ + struct neighbour *n; + + rcu_read_lock(); + n = __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref(dev, key); + if (n && !refcount_inc_not_zero(&n->refcnt)) + n = NULL; + rcu_read_unlock(); + + return n; +} + +static inline void __ipv4_confirm_neigh(struct net_device *dev, u32 key) +{ + struct neighbour *n; + + rcu_read_lock(); + n = __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref(dev, key); + neigh_confirm(n); + rcu_read_unlock(); +} + +void arp_init(void); +int arp_ioctl(struct net *net, unsigned int cmd, void __user *arg); +void arp_send(int type, int ptype, __be32 dest_ip, + struct net_device *dev, __be32 src_ip, + const unsigned char *dest_hw, + const unsigned char *src_hw, const unsigned char *th); +int arp_mc_map(__be32 addr, u8 *haddr, struct net_device *dev, int dir); +void arp_ifdown(struct net_device *dev); +int arp_invalidate(struct net_device *dev, __be32 ip, bool force); + +struct sk_buff *arp_create(int type, int ptype, __be32 dest_ip, + struct net_device *dev, __be32 src_ip, + const unsigned char *dest_hw, + const unsigned char *src_hw, + const unsigned char *target_hw); +void arp_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb); + +#endif /* _ARP_H */ |
