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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/net/af_unix.h
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staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/net/af_unix.h')
-rw-r--r--include/net/af_unix.h64
1 files changed, 64 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/net/af_unix.h b/include/net/af_unix.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bb1b3dee0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/net/af_unix.h
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __LINUX_NET_AFUNIX_H
+#define __LINUX_NET_AFUNIX_H
+
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/net.h>
+#include <linux/path.h>
+#include <linux/refcount.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/wait.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/un.h>
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UNIX)
+struct unix_sock *unix_get_socket(struct file *filp);
+#else
+static inline struct unix_sock *unix_get_socket(struct file *filp)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+#endif
+
+struct unix_address {
+ refcount_t refcnt;
+ int len;
+ struct sockaddr_un name[];
+};
+
+struct scm_stat {
+ atomic_t nr_fds;
+ unsigned long nr_unix_fds;
+};
+
+/* The AF_UNIX socket */
+struct unix_sock {
+ /* WARNING: sk has to be the first member */
+ struct sock sk;
+ struct unix_address *addr;
+ struct path path;
+ struct mutex iolock, bindlock;
+ struct sock *peer;
+ struct sock *listener;
+ struct unix_vertex *vertex;
+ spinlock_t lock;
+ struct socket_wq peer_wq;
+#define peer_wait peer_wq.wait
+ wait_queue_entry_t peer_wake;
+ struct scm_stat scm_stat;
+ int inq_len;
+ bool recvmsg_inq;
+ bool scm_rights_notrunc;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AF_UNIX_OOB)
+ struct sk_buff *oob_skb;
+#endif
+};
+
+#define unix_sk(ptr) container_of_const(ptr, struct unix_sock, sk)
+#define unix_peer(sk) (unix_sk(sk)->peer)
+
+#define unix_state_lock(s) spin_lock(&unix_sk(s)->lock)
+#define unix_state_unlock(s) spin_unlock(&unix_sk(s)->lock)
+
+#endif