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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/keys/asymmetric-parser.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/keys/asymmetric-parser.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/keys/asymmetric-parser.h | 35 |
1 files changed, 35 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/keys/asymmetric-parser.h b/include/keys/asymmetric-parser.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..516a3f511 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/keys/asymmetric-parser.h @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ +/* Asymmetric public-key cryptography data parser + * + * See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.rst + * + * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + */ + +#ifndef _KEYS_ASYMMETRIC_PARSER_H +#define _KEYS_ASYMMETRIC_PARSER_H + +struct key_preparsed_payload; + +/* + * Key data parser. Called during key instantiation. + */ +struct asymmetric_key_parser { + struct list_head link; + struct module *owner; + const char *name; + + /* Attempt to parse a key from the data blob passed to add_key() or + * keyctl_instantiate(). Should also generate a proposed description + * that the caller can optionally use for the key. + * + * Return EBADMSG if not recognised. + */ + int (*parse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep); +}; + +extern int register_asymmetric_key_parser(struct asymmetric_key_parser *); +extern void unregister_asymmetric_key_parser(struct asymmetric_key_parser *); + +#endif /* _KEYS_ASYMMETRIC_PARSER_H */ |
