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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/hyperv/hvgdk_ext.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/hyperv/hvgdk_ext.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/hyperv/hvgdk_ext.h | 46 |
1 files changed, 46 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/hyperv/hvgdk_ext.h b/include/hyperv/hvgdk_ext.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..641b591ee --- /dev/null +++ b/include/hyperv/hvgdk_ext.h @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Type definitions for the Microsoft Hypervisor. + */ +#ifndef _HV_HVGDK_EXT_H +#define _HV_HVGDK_EXT_H + +#include "hvgdk_mini.h" + +/* Extended hypercalls */ +#define HV_EXT_CALL_QUERY_CAPABILITIES 0x8001 +#define HV_EXT_CALL_MEMORY_HEAT_HINT 0x8003 + +/* Extended hypercalls */ +enum { /* HV_EXT_CALL */ + HV_EXTCALL_QUERY_CAPABILITIES = 0x8001, + HV_EXTCALL_MEMORY_HEAT_HINT = 0x8003, +}; + +/* HV_EXT_OUTPUT_QUERY_CAPABILITIES */ +#define HV_EXT_CAPABILITY_MEMORY_COLD_DISCARD_HINT BIT(8) + +enum { /* HV_EXT_MEMORY_HEAT_HINT_TYPE */ + HV_EXTMEM_HEAT_HINT_COLD = 0, + HV_EXTMEM_HEAT_HINT_HOT = 1, + HV_EXTMEM_HEAT_HINT_COLD_DISCARD = 2, + HV_EXTMEM_HEAT_HINT_MAX +}; + +/* + * The whole argument should fit in a page to be able to pass to the hypervisor + * in one hypercall. + */ +#define HV_MEMORY_HINT_MAX_GPA_PAGE_RANGES \ + ((HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(struct hv_memory_hint)) / \ + sizeof(union hv_gpa_page_range)) + +/* HvExtCallMemoryHeatHint hypercall */ +#define HV_EXT_MEMORY_HEAT_HINT_TYPE_COLD_DISCARD 2 +struct hv_memory_hint { /* HV_EXT_INPUT_MEMORY_HEAT_HINT */ + u64 heat_type : 2; /* HV_EXTMEM_HEAT_HINT_* */ + u64 reserved : 62; + union hv_gpa_page_range ranges[]; +} __packed; + +#endif /* _HV_HVGDK_EXT_H */ |
