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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/drm/intel/pick.h
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/drm/intel/pick.h')
-rw-r--r--include/drm/intel/pick.h51
1 files changed, 51 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/drm/intel/pick.h b/include/drm/intel/pick.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d976fab8f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/drm/intel/pick.h
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT */
+/* Copyright © 2026 Intel Corporation */
+
+#ifndef _PICK_H_
+#define _PICK_H_
+
+/*
+ * Given the first two numbers __a and __b of arbitrarily many evenly spaced
+ * numbers, pick the 0-based __index'th value.
+ *
+ * Always prefer this over _PICK() if the numbers are evenly spaced.
+ */
+#define _PICK_EVEN(__index, __a, __b) ((__a) + (__index) * ((__b) - (__a)))
+
+/*
+ * Like _PICK_EVEN(), but supports 2 ranges of evenly spaced address offsets.
+ * @__c_index corresponds to the index in which the second range starts to be
+ * used. Using math interval notation, the first range is used for indexes [ 0,
+ * @__c_index), while the second range is used for [ @__c_index, ... ). Example:
+ *
+ * #define _FOO_A 0xf000
+ * #define _FOO_B 0xf004
+ * #define _FOO_C 0xf008
+ * #define _SUPER_FOO_A 0xa000
+ * #define _SUPER_FOO_B 0xa100
+ * #define FOO(x) _MMIO(_PICK_EVEN_2RANGES(x, 3, \
+ * _FOO_A, _FOO_B, \
+ * _SUPER_FOO_A, _SUPER_FOO_B))
+ *
+ * This expands to:
+ * 0: 0xf000,
+ * 1: 0xf004,
+ * 2: 0xf008,
+ * 3: 0xa000,
+ * 4: 0xa100,
+ * 5: 0xa200,
+ * ...
+ */
+#define _PICK_EVEN_2RANGES(__index, __c_index, __a, __b, __c, __d) \
+ (BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(!__is_constexpr(__c_index)) + \
+ ((__index) < (__c_index) ? _PICK_EVEN(__index, __a, __b) : \
+ _PICK_EVEN((__index) - (__c_index), __c, __d)))
+
+/*
+ * Given the arbitrary numbers in varargs, pick the 0-based __index'th number.
+ *
+ * Always prefer _PICK_EVEN() over this if the numbers are evenly spaced.
+ */
+#define _PICK(__index, ...) (((const u32 []){ __VA_ARGS__ })[__index])
+
+#endif