diff options
| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/drm/intel/pick.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/drm/intel/pick.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/drm/intel/pick.h | 51 |
1 files changed, 51 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/drm/intel/pick.h b/include/drm/intel/pick.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d976fab8f --- /dev/null +++ b/include/drm/intel/pick.h @@ -0,0 +1,51 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT */ +/* Copyright © 2026 Intel Corporation */ + +#ifndef _PICK_H_ +#define _PICK_H_ + +/* + * Given the first two numbers __a and __b of arbitrarily many evenly spaced + * numbers, pick the 0-based __index'th value. + * + * Always prefer this over _PICK() if the numbers are evenly spaced. + */ +#define _PICK_EVEN(__index, __a, __b) ((__a) + (__index) * ((__b) - (__a))) + +/* + * Like _PICK_EVEN(), but supports 2 ranges of evenly spaced address offsets. + * @__c_index corresponds to the index in which the second range starts to be + * used. Using math interval notation, the first range is used for indexes [ 0, + * @__c_index), while the second range is used for [ @__c_index, ... ). Example: + * + * #define _FOO_A 0xf000 + * #define _FOO_B 0xf004 + * #define _FOO_C 0xf008 + * #define _SUPER_FOO_A 0xa000 + * #define _SUPER_FOO_B 0xa100 + * #define FOO(x) _MMIO(_PICK_EVEN_2RANGES(x, 3, \ + * _FOO_A, _FOO_B, \ + * _SUPER_FOO_A, _SUPER_FOO_B)) + * + * This expands to: + * 0: 0xf000, + * 1: 0xf004, + * 2: 0xf008, + * 3: 0xa000, + * 4: 0xa100, + * 5: 0xa200, + * ... + */ +#define _PICK_EVEN_2RANGES(__index, __c_index, __a, __b, __c, __d) \ + (BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(!__is_constexpr(__c_index)) + \ + ((__index) < (__c_index) ? _PICK_EVEN(__index, __a, __b) : \ + _PICK_EVEN((__index) - (__c_index), __c, __d))) + +/* + * Given the arbitrary numbers in varargs, pick the 0-based __index'th number. + * + * Always prefer _PICK_EVEN() over this if the numbers are evenly spaced. + */ +#define _PICK(__index, ...) (((const u32 []){ __VA_ARGS__ })[__index]) + +#endif |
