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authorAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>2026-10-01 14:52:55 +0000
committerKumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>2026-10-01 18:39:27 +0200
commit33a154a96e71a34a1bcca9f40da343dbbf7b38b4 (patch)
tree543be8029ab3d8a3a63994ae23385a053ed30029 /include/crypto/xts.h
downloadlinux-stable-33a154a96e71a34a1bcca9f40da343dbbf7b38b4.tar.gz
linux-stable-33a154a96e71a34a1bcca9f40da343dbbf7b38b4.zip
selftests/bpf: Test packet range of pointers sharing an idgrafted
Add tests where two packet pointers share an id and tightening one pointer's umax from its var_off would put it less than their constant distance from the other's umax: with an index & 0x38 capped at 50, the base pointer keeps umax 50, so the pointer 8 bytes further on must keep umax 58, even though its known bits allow at most 56. These refused a valid program or accepted an out-of-bounds access before the fix: - check the advanced copy, load through the base: valid, was refused; - check the base, load the byte at base + 1 through a copy advanced by 8: was accepted; - check base + 4, load 4 bytes at base + 2 through base + 8: reads two bytes past the checked range, was accepted; - the same as the second with data_meta pointers checked against data: was accepted. These pass with and without the fix and cover nearby paths: - subtract an unknown scalar from a checked pointer and load below it (the range is kept across a new id); - reach a load through two paths whose checks cover 8 and 7 bytes after the loaded pointer; the second path must not be pruned by the first; - spill a copy of a pointer, check the pointer, fill the copy and load one byte past the checked range: the load is refused, and the copy has the range of the check. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20261001145255.855630-2-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/crypto/xts.h')
-rw-r--r--include/crypto/xts.h50
1 files changed, 50 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/crypto/xts.h b/include/crypto/xts.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..16aef89f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/crypto/xts.h
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _CRYPTO_XTS_H
+#define _CRYPTO_XTS_H
+
+#include <crypto/b128ops.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
+#include <linux/fips.h>
+
+#define XTS_BLOCK_SIZE 16
+#define XTS_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS (1 << 0)
+
+static inline int __xts_verify_key(const u8 *key, size_t keylen, int flags)
+{
+ /*
+ * key consists of keys of equal size concatenated, therefore
+ * the length must be even.
+ */
+ if (keylen % 2)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * In FIPS mode only a combined key length of either 256 or
+ * 512 bits is allowed, c.f. FIPS 140-3 IG C.I.
+ */
+ if (fips_enabled && keylen != 32 && keylen != 64)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure that the AES and tweak key are not identical when
+ * in FIPS mode or the FORBID_WEAK_KEYS flag is set.
+ */
+ if ((fips_enabled || (flags & XTS_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS)) &&
+ !crypto_memneq(key, key + (keylen / 2), keylen / 2))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int xts_verify_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
+ unsigned int keylen)
+{
+ int flags = (crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tfm) &
+ CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS) ?
+ XTS_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS :
+ 0;
+
+ return __xts_verify_key(key, keylen, flags);
+}
+
+#endif /* _CRYPTO_XTS_H */