Merge tag 'ipe-pr-20260925' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wufan/ipegrafted

Pull IPE fixes from Fan Wu:
 "Two fixes for use-after-free issues found by recent LLM-assisted code
  analysis.

   - move successful policy load auditing under the new policy
     directory's inode lock, preventing a concurrent policy deletion
     from freeing the policy while it is still being audited

   - protect the dm-verity root hash with RCU, preventing policy
     evaluation from racing with root hash replacement during preresume"

* tag 'ipe-pr-20260925' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wufan/ipe:
  ipe: protect the dm-verity root hash with RCU
  ipe: fix use-after-free when auditing a newly loaded policy

1 files changed, 73 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/include/crypto/utils.h b/include/crypto/utils.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2594f4577
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/crypto/utils.h
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
+/*
+ * Cryptographic utilities
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2023 Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+ */
+#ifndef _CRYPTO_UTILS_H
+#define _CRYPTO_UTILS_H
+
+#include <linux/unaligned.h>
+#include <linux/compiler_attributes.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+void __crypto_xor(u8 *dst, const u8 *src1, const u8 *src2, unsigned int size);
+
+static inline void crypto_xor(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, unsigned int size)
+{
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) &&
+	    __builtin_constant_p(size) &&
+	    (size % sizeof(unsigned long)) == 0) {
+		unsigned long *d = (unsigned long *)dst;
+		unsigned long *s = (unsigned long *)src;
+		unsigned long l;
+
+		while (size > 0) {
+			l = get_unaligned(d) ^ get_unaligned(s++);
+			put_unaligned(l, d++);
+			size -= sizeof(unsigned long);
+		}
+	} else {
+		__crypto_xor(dst, dst, src, size);
+	}
+}
+
+static inline void crypto_xor_cpy(u8 *dst, const u8 *src1, const u8 *src2,
+				  unsigned int size)
+{
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) &&
+	    __builtin_constant_p(size) &&
+	    (size % sizeof(unsigned long)) == 0) {
+		unsigned long *d = (unsigned long *)dst;
+		unsigned long *s1 = (unsigned long *)src1;
+		unsigned long *s2 = (unsigned long *)src2;
+		unsigned long l;
+
+		while (size > 0) {
+			l = get_unaligned(s1++) ^ get_unaligned(s2++);
+			put_unaligned(l, d++);
+			size -= sizeof(unsigned long);
+		}
+	} else {
+		__crypto_xor(dst, src1, src2, size);
+	}
+}
+
+noinline unsigned long __crypto_memneq(const void *a, const void *b, size_t size);
+
+/**
+ * crypto_memneq - Compare two areas of memory without leaking
+ *		   timing information.
+ *
+ * @a: One area of memory
+ * @b: Another area of memory
+ * @size: The size of the area.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 when data is equal, 1 otherwise.
+ */
+static inline int crypto_memneq(const void *a, const void *b, size_t size)
+{
+	return __crypto_memneq(a, b, size) != 0UL ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+#endif	/* _CRYPTO_UTILS_H */