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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/crypto/public_key.h
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linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/crypto/public_key.h')
-rw-r--r--include/crypto/public_key.h124
1 files changed, 124 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4c5199b20
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
+/* Asymmetric public-key algorithm definitions
+ *
+ * See Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.rst
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#ifndef _LINUX_PUBLIC_KEY_H
+#define _LINUX_PUBLIC_KEY_H
+
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/keyctl.h>
+#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
+
+/*
+ * Cryptographic data for the public-key subtype of the asymmetric key type.
+ *
+ * Note that this may include private part of the key as well as the public
+ * part.
+ */
+struct public_key {
+ void *key;
+ u32 keylen;
+ enum OID algo;
+ void *params;
+ u32 paramlen;
+ bool key_is_private;
+ const char *id_type;
+ const char *pkey_algo;
+ unsigned long key_eflags; /* key extension flags */
+#define KEY_EFLAG_CA 0 /* set if the CA basic constraints is set */
+#define KEY_EFLAG_DIGITALSIG 1 /* set if the digitalSignature usage is set */
+#define KEY_EFLAG_KEYCERTSIGN 2 /* set if the keyCertSign usage is set */
+};
+
+extern void public_key_free(struct public_key *key);
+
+/*
+ * Public key cryptography signature data
+ */
+struct public_key_signature {
+ struct asymmetric_key_id *auth_ids[3];
+ u8 *s; /* Signature */
+ u8 *m; /* Message data to pass to verifier */
+ u32 s_size; /* Number of bytes in signature */
+ u32 m_size; /* Number of bytes in ->m */
+ bool m_free; /* T if ->m needs freeing */
+ bool algo_takes_data; /* T if public key algo operates on data, not a hash */
+ const char *pkey_algo;
+ const char *hash_algo;
+ const char *encoding;
+};
+
+extern void public_key_signature_free(struct public_key_signature *sig);
+
+extern struct asymmetric_key_subtype public_key_subtype;
+
+struct key;
+struct key_type;
+union key_payload;
+
+extern int restrict_link_by_signature(struct key *dest_keyring,
+ const struct key_type *type,
+ const union key_payload *payload,
+ struct key *trust_keyring);
+
+extern int restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring(struct key *dest_keyring,
+ const struct key_type *type,
+ const union key_payload *payload,
+ struct key *trusted);
+
+extern int restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain(struct key *trust_keyring,
+ const struct key_type *type,
+ const union key_payload *payload,
+ struct key *trusted);
+
+#if IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE)
+extern int restrict_link_by_ca(struct key *dest_keyring,
+ const struct key_type *type,
+ const union key_payload *payload,
+ struct key *trust_keyring);
+int restrict_link_by_digsig(struct key *dest_keyring,
+ const struct key_type *type,
+ const union key_payload *payload,
+ struct key *trust_keyring);
+#else
+static inline int restrict_link_by_ca(struct key *dest_keyring,
+ const struct key_type *type,
+ const union key_payload *payload,
+ struct key *trust_keyring)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int restrict_link_by_digsig(struct key *dest_keyring,
+ const struct key_type *type,
+ const union key_payload *payload,
+ struct key *trust_keyring)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+extern int query_asymmetric_key(const struct kernel_pkey_params *,
+ struct kernel_pkey_query *);
+
+extern int verify_signature(const struct key *,
+ const struct public_key_signature *);
+
+#if IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE)
+int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey,
+ const struct public_key_signature *sig);
+#else
+static inline
+int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey,
+ const struct public_key_signature *sig)
+{
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_PUBLIC_KEY_H */