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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/crypto/pkcs7.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/crypto/pkcs7.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/crypto/pkcs7.h | 47 |
1 files changed, 47 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/crypto/pkcs7.h b/include/crypto/pkcs7.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..38ec7f5f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/crypto/pkcs7.h @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ +/* PKCS#7 crypto data parser + * + * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + */ + +#ifndef _CRYPTO_PKCS7_H +#define _CRYPTO_PKCS7_H + +#include <linux/verification.h> +#include <linux/hash_info.h> +#include <crypto/public_key.h> + +struct key; +struct pkcs7_message; + +/* + * pkcs7_parser.c + */ +extern struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7_parse_message(const void *data, + size_t datalen); +extern void pkcs7_free_message(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7); + +extern int pkcs7_get_content_data(const struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, + const void **_data, size_t *_datalen, + size_t *_headerlen); + +/* + * pkcs7_trust.c + */ +extern int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, + struct key *trust_keyring); + +/* + * pkcs7_verify.c + */ +extern int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, + enum key_being_used_for usage); + +extern int pkcs7_supply_detached_data(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, + const void *data, size_t datalen); + +extern int pkcs7_get_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, const u8 **buf, + u32 *len, enum hash_algo *hash_algo); + +#endif /* _CRYPTO_PKCS7_H */ |
