diff options
| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /include/crypto/nh.h | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/crypto/nh.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/crypto/nh.h | 52 |
1 files changed, 52 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/crypto/nh.h b/include/crypto/nh.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..465e85bf2 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/crypto/nh.h @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * NH hash function for Adiantum + */ + +#ifndef _CRYPTO_NH_H +#define _CRYPTO_NH_H + +#include <linux/types.h> + +/* NH parameterization: */ + +/* Endianness: little */ +/* Word size: 32 bits (works well on NEON, SSE2, AVX2) */ + +/* Stride: 2 words (optimal on ARM32 NEON; works okay on other CPUs too) */ +#define NH_PAIR_STRIDE 2 +#define NH_MESSAGE_UNIT (NH_PAIR_STRIDE * 2 * sizeof(u32)) + +/* Num passes (Toeplitz iteration count): 4, to give ε = 2^{-128} */ +#define NH_NUM_PASSES 4 +#define NH_HASH_BYTES (NH_NUM_PASSES * sizeof(u64)) + +/* Max message size: 1024 bytes (32x compression factor) */ +#define NH_NUM_STRIDES 64 +#define NH_MESSAGE_WORDS (NH_PAIR_STRIDE * 2 * NH_NUM_STRIDES) +#define NH_MESSAGE_BYTES (NH_MESSAGE_WORDS * sizeof(u32)) +#define NH_KEY_WORDS (NH_MESSAGE_WORDS + \ + NH_PAIR_STRIDE * 2 * (NH_NUM_PASSES - 1)) +#define NH_KEY_BYTES (NH_KEY_WORDS * sizeof(u32)) + +/** + * nh() - NH hash function for Adiantum + * @key: The key. @message_len + 48 bytes of it are used. This is NH_KEY_BYTES + * if @message_len has its maximum length of NH_MESSAGE_BYTES. + * @message: The message + * @message_len: The message length in bytes. Must be a multiple of 16 + * (NH_MESSAGE_UNIT) and at most 1024 (NH_MESSAGE_BYTES). + * @hash: (output) The resulting hash value + * + * Note: the pseudocode for NH in the Adiantum paper iterates over 1024-byte + * segments of the message, computes a 32-byte hash for each, and returns all + * the hashes concatenated together. In contrast, this function just hashes one + * segment and returns one hash. It's the caller's responsibility to call this + * function for each 1024-byte segment and collect all the hashes. + * + * Context: Any context. + */ +void nh(const u32 *key, const u8 *message, size_t message_len, + __le64 hash[NH_NUM_PASSES]); + +#endif /* _CRYPTO_NH_H */ |
