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authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /include/crypto/mldsa.h
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/crypto/mldsa.h')
-rw-r--r--include/crypto/mldsa.h62
1 files changed, 62 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/crypto/mldsa.h b/include/crypto/mldsa.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3ef267678
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/crypto/mldsa.h
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
+/*
+ * Support for verifying ML-DSA signatures
+ *
+ * Copyright 2025 Google LLC
+ */
+#ifndef _CRYPTO_MLDSA_H
+#define _CRYPTO_MLDSA_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+/* Identifier for an ML-DSA parameter set */
+enum mldsa_alg {
+ MLDSA44, /* ML-DSA-44 */
+ MLDSA65, /* ML-DSA-65 */
+ MLDSA87, /* ML-DSA-87 */
+};
+
+/* Lengths of ML-DSA public keys and signatures in bytes */
+#define MLDSA44_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE 1312
+#define MLDSA65_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE 1952
+#define MLDSA87_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE 2592
+#define MLDSA44_SIGNATURE_SIZE 2420
+#define MLDSA65_SIGNATURE_SIZE 3309
+#define MLDSA87_SIGNATURE_SIZE 4627
+
+/**
+ * mldsa_verify() - Verify an ML-DSA signature
+ * @alg: The ML-DSA parameter set to use
+ * @sig: The signature
+ * @sig_len: Length of the signature in bytes. Should match the
+ * MLDSA*_SIGNATURE_SIZE constant associated with @alg,
+ * otherwise -EBADMSG will be returned.
+ * @msg: The message
+ * @msg_len: Length of the message in bytes
+ * @pk: The public key
+ * @pk_len: Length of the public key in bytes. Should match the
+ * MLDSA*_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE constant associated with @alg,
+ * otherwise -EBADMSG will be returned.
+ *
+ * This verifies a signature using pure ML-DSA with the specified parameter set.
+ * The context string is assumed to be empty. This corresponds to FIPS 204
+ * Algorithm 3 "ML-DSA.Verify" with the ctx parameter set to the empty string
+ * and the lengths of the signature and key given explicitly by the caller.
+ *
+ * Context: Might sleep
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * * 0 if the signature is valid
+ * * -EBADMSG if the signature and/or public key is malformed
+ * * -EKEYREJECTED if the signature is invalid but otherwise well-formed
+ * * -ENOMEM if out of memory so the validity of the signature is unknown
+ */
+int mldsa_verify(enum mldsa_alg alg, const u8 *sig, size_t sig_len,
+ const u8 *msg, size_t msg_len, const u8 *pk, size_t pk_len);
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_MLDSA_KUNIT_TEST)
+/* Internal function, exposed only for unit testing */
+s32 mldsa_use_hint(u8 h, s32 r, s32 gamma2);
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _CRYPTO_MLDSA_H */