diff options
| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/crypto/internal/poly1305.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/crypto/internal/poly1305.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/crypto/internal/poly1305.h | 56 |
1 files changed, 56 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/crypto/internal/poly1305.h b/include/crypto/internal/poly1305.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a72fff409 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/crypto/internal/poly1305.h @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Common values for the Poly1305 algorithm + */ + +#ifndef _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_POLY1305_H +#define _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_POLY1305_H + +#include <crypto/poly1305.h> +#include <linux/types.h> + +/* + * Poly1305 core functions. These only accept whole blocks; the caller must + * handle any needed block buffering and padding. 'hibit' must be 1 for any + * full blocks, or 0 for the final block if it had to be padded. If 'nonce' is + * non-NULL, then it's added at the end to compute the Poly1305 MAC. Otherwise, + * only the ε-almost-∆-universal hash function (not the full MAC) is computed. + */ + +void poly1305_core_setkey(struct poly1305_core_key *key, + const u8 raw_key[POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE]); +static inline void poly1305_core_init(struct poly1305_state *state) +{ + *state = (struct poly1305_state){}; +} + +void poly1305_core_blocks(struct poly1305_state *state, + const struct poly1305_core_key *key, const void *src, + unsigned int nblocks, u32 hibit); +void poly1305_core_emit(const struct poly1305_state *state, const u32 nonce[4], + void *dst); + +static inline void +poly1305_block_init_generic(struct poly1305_block_state *desc, + const u8 raw_key[POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE]) +{ + poly1305_core_init(&desc->h); + poly1305_core_setkey(&desc->core_r, raw_key); +} + +static inline void poly1305_blocks_generic(struct poly1305_block_state *state, + const u8 *src, unsigned int len, + u32 padbit) +{ + poly1305_core_blocks(&state->h, &state->core_r, src, + len / POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE, padbit); +} + +static inline void poly1305_emit_generic(const struct poly1305_state *state, + u8 digest[POLY1305_DIGEST_SIZE], + const u32 nonce[4]) +{ + poly1305_core_emit(state, nonce, digest); +} + +#endif |
