summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/include/crypto/internal/poly1305.h
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/crypto/internal/poly1305.h
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/crypto/internal/poly1305.h')
-rw-r--r--include/crypto/internal/poly1305.h56
1 files changed, 56 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/crypto/internal/poly1305.h b/include/crypto/internal/poly1305.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a72fff409
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/crypto/internal/poly1305.h
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Common values for the Poly1305 algorithm
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_POLY1305_H
+#define _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_POLY1305_H
+
+#include <crypto/poly1305.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+/*
+ * Poly1305 core functions. These only accept whole blocks; the caller must
+ * handle any needed block buffering and padding. 'hibit' must be 1 for any
+ * full blocks, or 0 for the final block if it had to be padded. If 'nonce' is
+ * non-NULL, then it's added at the end to compute the Poly1305 MAC. Otherwise,
+ * only the ε-almost-∆-universal hash function (not the full MAC) is computed.
+ */
+
+void poly1305_core_setkey(struct poly1305_core_key *key,
+ const u8 raw_key[POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE]);
+static inline void poly1305_core_init(struct poly1305_state *state)
+{
+ *state = (struct poly1305_state){};
+}
+
+void poly1305_core_blocks(struct poly1305_state *state,
+ const struct poly1305_core_key *key, const void *src,
+ unsigned int nblocks, u32 hibit);
+void poly1305_core_emit(const struct poly1305_state *state, const u32 nonce[4],
+ void *dst);
+
+static inline void
+poly1305_block_init_generic(struct poly1305_block_state *desc,
+ const u8 raw_key[POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE])
+{
+ poly1305_core_init(&desc->h);
+ poly1305_core_setkey(&desc->core_r, raw_key);
+}
+
+static inline void poly1305_blocks_generic(struct poly1305_block_state *state,
+ const u8 *src, unsigned int len,
+ u32 padbit)
+{
+ poly1305_core_blocks(&state->h, &state->core_r, src,
+ len / POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE, padbit);
+}
+
+static inline void poly1305_emit_generic(const struct poly1305_state *state,
+ u8 digest[POLY1305_DIGEST_SIZE],
+ const u32 nonce[4])
+{
+ poly1305_core_emit(state, nonce, digest);
+}
+
+#endif