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authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /include/crypto/gcm.h
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/crypto/gcm.h')
-rw-r--r--include/crypto/gcm.h85
1 files changed, 85 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/crypto/gcm.h b/include/crypto/gcm.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1d5f39ff1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/crypto/gcm.h
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+#ifndef _CRYPTO_GCM_H
+#define _CRYPTO_GCM_H
+
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+
+#include <crypto/aes.h>
+#include <crypto/gf128hash.h>
+
+#define GCM_AES_IV_SIZE 12
+#define GCM_RFC4106_IV_SIZE 8
+#define GCM_RFC4543_IV_SIZE 8
+
+/*
+ * validate authentication tag for GCM
+ */
+static inline int crypto_gcm_check_authsize(unsigned int authsize)
+{
+ switch (authsize) {
+ case 4:
+ case 8:
+ case 12:
+ case 13:
+ case 14:
+ case 15:
+ case 16:
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * validate authentication tag for RFC4106
+ */
+static inline int crypto_rfc4106_check_authsize(unsigned int authsize)
+{
+ switch (authsize) {
+ case 8:
+ case 12:
+ case 16:
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * validate assoclen for RFC4106/RFC4543
+ */
+static inline int crypto_ipsec_check_assoclen(unsigned int assoclen)
+{
+ switch (assoclen) {
+ case 16:
+ case 20:
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+struct aesgcm_ctx {
+ struct ghash_key ghash_key;
+ struct aes_enckey aes_key;
+ unsigned int authsize;
+};
+
+int aesgcm_expandkey(struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx, const u8 *key,
+ unsigned int keysize, unsigned int authsize);
+
+void aesgcm_encrypt(const struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ int crypt_len, const u8 *assoc, int assoc_len,
+ const u8 iv[GCM_AES_IV_SIZE], u8 *authtag);
+
+bool __must_check aesgcm_decrypt(const struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
+ const u8 *src, int crypt_len, const u8 *assoc,
+ int assoc_len, const u8 iv[GCM_AES_IV_SIZE],
+ const u8 *authtag);
+
+#endif