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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/crypto/chacha.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/crypto/chacha.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/crypto/chacha.h | 102 |
1 files changed, 102 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/crypto/chacha.h b/include/crypto/chacha.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1cc301a48 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/crypto/chacha.h @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Common values and helper functions for the ChaCha and XChaCha stream ciphers. + * + * XChaCha extends ChaCha's nonce to 192 bits, while provably retaining ChaCha's + * security. Here they share the same key size, tfm context, and setkey + * function; only their IV size and encrypt/decrypt function differ. + * + * The ChaCha paper specifies 20, 12, and 8-round variants. In general, it is + * recommended to use the 20-round variant ChaCha20. However, the other + * variants can be needed in some performance-sensitive scenarios. The generic + * ChaCha code currently allows only the 20 and 12-round variants. + */ + +#ifndef _CRYPTO_CHACHA_H +#define _CRYPTO_CHACHA_H + +#include <linux/unaligned.h> +#include <linux/string.h> +#include <linux/types.h> + +/* 32-bit stream position, then 96-bit nonce (RFC7539 convention) */ +#define CHACHA_IV_SIZE 16 + +#define CHACHA_KEY_SIZE 32 +#define CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE 64 +#define CHACHAPOLY_IV_SIZE 12 + +#define CHACHA_KEY_WORDS 8 +#define CHACHA_STATE_WORDS 16 +#define HCHACHA_OUT_WORDS 8 + +/* 192-bit nonce, then 64-bit stream position */ +#define XCHACHA_IV_SIZE 32 + +struct chacha_state { + u32 x[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS]; +}; + +void chacha_block_generic(struct chacha_state *state, + u8 out[at_least CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int nrounds); +static inline void chacha20_block(struct chacha_state *state, + u8 out[at_least CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]) +{ + chacha_block_generic(state, out, 20); +} + +void hchacha_block_generic(const struct chacha_state *state, + u32 out[at_least HCHACHA_OUT_WORDS], int nrounds); + +void hchacha_block(const struct chacha_state *state, + u32 out[at_least HCHACHA_OUT_WORDS], int nrounds); + +enum chacha_constants { /* expand 32-byte k */ + CHACHA_CONSTANT_EXPA = 0x61707865U, + CHACHA_CONSTANT_ND_3 = 0x3320646eU, + CHACHA_CONSTANT_2_BY = 0x79622d32U, + CHACHA_CONSTANT_TE_K = 0x6b206574U +}; + +static inline void chacha_init_consts(struct chacha_state *state) +{ + state->x[0] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_EXPA; + state->x[1] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_ND_3; + state->x[2] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_2_BY; + state->x[3] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_TE_K; +} + +static inline void chacha_init(struct chacha_state *state, + const u32 key[at_least CHACHA_KEY_WORDS], + const u8 iv[at_least CHACHA_IV_SIZE]) +{ + chacha_init_consts(state); + state->x[4] = key[0]; + state->x[5] = key[1]; + state->x[6] = key[2]; + state->x[7] = key[3]; + state->x[8] = key[4]; + state->x[9] = key[5]; + state->x[10] = key[6]; + state->x[11] = key[7]; + state->x[12] = get_unaligned_le32(iv + 0); + state->x[13] = get_unaligned_le32(iv + 4); + state->x[14] = get_unaligned_le32(iv + 8); + state->x[15] = get_unaligned_le32(iv + 12); +} + +void chacha_crypt(struct chacha_state *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, + unsigned int bytes, int nrounds); + +static inline void chacha20_crypt(struct chacha_state *state, + u8 *dst, const u8 *src, unsigned int bytes) +{ + chacha_crypt(state, dst, src, bytes, 20); +} + +static inline void chacha_zeroize_state(struct chacha_state *state) +{ + memzero_explicit(state, sizeof(*state)); +} + +#endif /* _CRYPTO_CHACHA_H */ |
