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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/crypto/chacha.h
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/crypto/chacha.h')
-rw-r--r--include/crypto/chacha.h102
1 files changed, 102 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/crypto/chacha.h b/include/crypto/chacha.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1cc301a48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/crypto/chacha.h
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Common values and helper functions for the ChaCha and XChaCha stream ciphers.
+ *
+ * XChaCha extends ChaCha's nonce to 192 bits, while provably retaining ChaCha's
+ * security. Here they share the same key size, tfm context, and setkey
+ * function; only their IV size and encrypt/decrypt function differ.
+ *
+ * The ChaCha paper specifies 20, 12, and 8-round variants. In general, it is
+ * recommended to use the 20-round variant ChaCha20. However, the other
+ * variants can be needed in some performance-sensitive scenarios. The generic
+ * ChaCha code currently allows only the 20 and 12-round variants.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CRYPTO_CHACHA_H
+#define _CRYPTO_CHACHA_H
+
+#include <linux/unaligned.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+/* 32-bit stream position, then 96-bit nonce (RFC7539 convention) */
+#define CHACHA_IV_SIZE 16
+
+#define CHACHA_KEY_SIZE 32
+#define CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE 64
+#define CHACHAPOLY_IV_SIZE 12
+
+#define CHACHA_KEY_WORDS 8
+#define CHACHA_STATE_WORDS 16
+#define HCHACHA_OUT_WORDS 8
+
+/* 192-bit nonce, then 64-bit stream position */
+#define XCHACHA_IV_SIZE 32
+
+struct chacha_state {
+ u32 x[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS];
+};
+
+void chacha_block_generic(struct chacha_state *state,
+ u8 out[at_least CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int nrounds);
+static inline void chacha20_block(struct chacha_state *state,
+ u8 out[at_least CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE])
+{
+ chacha_block_generic(state, out, 20);
+}
+
+void hchacha_block_generic(const struct chacha_state *state,
+ u32 out[at_least HCHACHA_OUT_WORDS], int nrounds);
+
+void hchacha_block(const struct chacha_state *state,
+ u32 out[at_least HCHACHA_OUT_WORDS], int nrounds);
+
+enum chacha_constants { /* expand 32-byte k */
+ CHACHA_CONSTANT_EXPA = 0x61707865U,
+ CHACHA_CONSTANT_ND_3 = 0x3320646eU,
+ CHACHA_CONSTANT_2_BY = 0x79622d32U,
+ CHACHA_CONSTANT_TE_K = 0x6b206574U
+};
+
+static inline void chacha_init_consts(struct chacha_state *state)
+{
+ state->x[0] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_EXPA;
+ state->x[1] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_ND_3;
+ state->x[2] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_2_BY;
+ state->x[3] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_TE_K;
+}
+
+static inline void chacha_init(struct chacha_state *state,
+ const u32 key[at_least CHACHA_KEY_WORDS],
+ const u8 iv[at_least CHACHA_IV_SIZE])
+{
+ chacha_init_consts(state);
+ state->x[4] = key[0];
+ state->x[5] = key[1];
+ state->x[6] = key[2];
+ state->x[7] = key[3];
+ state->x[8] = key[4];
+ state->x[9] = key[5];
+ state->x[10] = key[6];
+ state->x[11] = key[7];
+ state->x[12] = get_unaligned_le32(iv + 0);
+ state->x[13] = get_unaligned_le32(iv + 4);
+ state->x[14] = get_unaligned_le32(iv + 8);
+ state->x[15] = get_unaligned_le32(iv + 12);
+}
+
+void chacha_crypt(struct chacha_state *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+ unsigned int bytes, int nrounds);
+
+static inline void chacha20_crypt(struct chacha_state *state,
+ u8 *dst, const u8 *src, unsigned int bytes)
+{
+ chacha_crypt(state, dst, src, bytes, 20);
+}
+
+static inline void chacha_zeroize_state(struct chacha_state *state)
+{
+ memzero_explicit(state, sizeof(*state));
+}
+
+#endif /* _CRYPTO_CHACHA_H */