Merge tag 'trace-v7.3-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-tracegrafted

Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:

 - Don't destroy user event fields when removal fails

   User event fields are destroyed before the event is removed from
   visibility. But that can fail leaving the still visible event with no
   fields. Move the destroying of the fields to after the event is
   successfully removed from visibility.

 - Initialize function graph state is fork before calling
   copy_exec_state()

   For non-CLONE_VM forks, copy_exec_state() allocates a new
   task_exec_state. If that allocation fails, ftrace_graph_exit_task()
   will free the tasks ret_stack pointer. Since that pointer is still
   using the parent's ret_stack, it mistakenly frees the parent's
   pointer too.

   Call ftrace_graph_init() on the task first which will NULL out the
   new tasks's ret_stack and if the copy fails, it will not free
   anything.

 - Remove FGRAPH_MAX_INDEX

   The macro FGRAPH_MAX_INDEX was added but never used. Remove it.

 - Save ent_size in function graph printing of nested functions

   The function graph tracer needs to look at the next event to see if
   the next event is the return of the current function entry. If it is,
   it prints a single line:

	ktime_get();

   Otherwise it prints it like a nested function:

	tick_nohz_irq_exit() {
	    ktime_get();
	    kcpustat_irq_exit();
	}

   In order to look at the next event, it must save the current event so
   that it has the information to print from it. It saves the event in
   the iterator descriptor called "ent". What it doesn't save is the
   ent_size of the event which is now used to know if the function graph
   arguments are to be printed. The peek doesn't save the size so the
   size used happens to be that of the size of the last event that was
   seen.

   Save the entry event size in the iterator descriptor so that the
   correct size is used.

 - Fix several errors with freeing data in the histogram code

   The histogram code had a lot of leaked or or incorrect accounting
   when failures happen. Correct them.

 - Fix histogram regression of .percent and .graph modifiers

   Up until 6.3 histogram values could have "percent" or "graph"
   modifiers that changed how they were printed. But a change that added
   restricting histograms values from being strings, stack traces and
   other modifiers inadvertently prevented them from using the percent
   and graph modifiers, which were legal use cases for values.

   Put back the percent and graph modifiers.

 - Fix various typos in the comments

 - Set the trace_clock before initializing a histogram with clock
   argument

   The histogram API allows the user to specific which trace clock to
   use via a "clock=" string. The histogram is set up first before the
   clock is checked. If the passed in clock is not valid, it exits
   without fully fixing up the histogram leaving it on the list and a
   use-after-free can trigger.

   Update the clock argument first and if it fails then exit gracefully
   before the histogram trigger is placed on any lists.

 - Restore :mod: trailer after parsing in ftrace_set_clr_event

   The function ftrace_set_clr_event() modifies the parse string and
   needs to put it back to what was passed in. It searches for ":mod:"
   via a strsep() but fails to put back the first ':' in the string.

   Add back the ':' in the passed in string.

 - Take trace_array reference when opening a tracer options file

   The options files are dynamically created and some tracers add their
   own options. When a tracer adds their own list of options, the
   trace_array holding them has an array to hold the list of options for
   each tracer. This array increases in size via a krealloc(), and the
   new entry gets a newly allocated array to hold the options of the new
   tracer being added.

   The element in each entry of the tracer's option array holds a
   pointer back to the trace_array, a pointer to the tracer it is
   associated to, a pointer to the flags of the option.

   The issue is that these arrays are freed when the trace_array is
   freed when its instance it represents is removed from the instances
   directory. There's a race that an open of one of these options files
   can happen when the instance is being removed.

   Add a new helper function to be called by the open function of the
   options file to iterate all existing trace_arrays under a lock and
   find the one that has the given option element in one of it's tracer
   arrays. If found, then update the associated trace_array's reference
   counter to keep it from being freed. If not found, have the open call
   return -ENODEV.

 - Disable interrupts when acquiring the lock in rb_wake_up_waiters()

   The function rb_wake_up_waiters() assumes it will be called in
   interrupt context and does not disable irqs when taking
   cpu_buffer->reader_lock, which can be called in hard interrupt
   context. The issue is in PREEMPT_RT, this function is called in
   thread context leaving this lock open to a deadlock.

   Take the lock with interrupts disabled.

 - Use rcu_assign_pointer() for tmp_ops filter hash

   The tmp_ops used in update_ftrace_direct_mod() assigns its
   filter_hash field directly, but that field is annotated as __rcu and
   sparse complains. Assign it with rcu_assign_pointer()

 - Fix use-after-free in enable_trigger_private_data_free()

   The trace_event_call is accessed through the event_trigger_data's
   trace_event_file pointer to put the trace_event_call on freeing. The
   issue is that the trace_event_file data may have been freed already
   causing a use-after-free. Add a field to the event_trigger_data that
   points directly to the trace_event_call so that it can decrement its
   reference directly without needing to go through the
   trace_event_file.

 - Fix accounting of buffer data remote headers

   trace_buffer_desc_size() and trace_remote_alloc_buffer() undercount
   the number of pages is needed for the asked for size as it doesn't
   take into account the meta data on each page. Add a helper function
   to do the calculation properly and use that in these functions.

 - Catch nr_page_va overflow in ring_buffer_desc sizing

   The number of pages per remote ring buffer is capped by
   ring_buffer_desc::nr_page_va (32 bits). A buffer_size large enough to
   overflow that field would silently allocate a descriptor smaller than
   what was asked for.

 - Do not resize the subbuf order if any per_cpu buffer is disabled

   The mmapping of ring buffers disables resizing the subbuffers, but it
   is done per-cpu whereas the subbuf size change is done for all the
   per_cpu buffers under the buffer->mutex. It could change the size of
   some while the mapping is happening on others. Have the resize of the
   subbuf order check all the per_cpu buffers under the lock to see if
   any of them is disabled before starting and causing an inconsistency
   between buffers that are being mapped.

* tag 'trace-v7.3-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace: (25 commits)
  ring-buffer: Check resize_disabled before publishing the new subbuf order
  tracing/remotes: Catch nr_page_va overflow in ring_buffer_desc sizing
  tracing/remotes: Account for ring buffer page header in size calculation
  tracing: Don't dereference trace_event_file in deferred trigger free
  ftrace: Use rcu_assign_pointer() for tmp_ops filter hash
  ring-buffer: Acquire the lock with irqsave in rb_wake_up_waiters()
  tracing: Take trace_array reference when opening a tracer options file
  tracing: Fix ring_buffer_read_page_size() kernel-doc
  tracing: Restore :mod: trailer after parsing in ftrace_set_clr_event()
  tracing: Fix memory corruption from a "STACKTRACE" histogram key
  tracing: Fix memory corruption from the histogram stacktrace modifier
  tracing: Undo the registration when enabling the histogram trigger fails
  tracing: Take the reference before publishing the named histogram trigger
  tracing: Set the trace clock before registering the histogram trigger
  tracing: Fix typo "preceeded" in comment
  tracing: Fix typo "availabe" in comment
  tracing: Let histogram values keep the percent and graph modifiers
  tracing: Keep the entry count when the histogram stats allocation fails
  tracing: Free histogram the field rejected for a bad modifier
  tracing: Free histogram the var ref when its initialization fails
  ...

1 files changed, 401 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/include/crypto/aes.h b/include/crypto/aes.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3279cfa54
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/crypto/aes.h
@@ -0,0 +1,401 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Common values for AES algorithms
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CRYPTO_AES_H
+#define _CRYPTO_AES_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+
+#define AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE	16
+#define AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE	32
+#define AES_KEYSIZE_128		16
+#define AES_KEYSIZE_192		24
+#define AES_KEYSIZE_256		32
+#define AES_BLOCK_SIZE		16
+#define AES_MAX_KEYLENGTH	(15 * 16)
+#define AES_MAX_KEYLENGTH_U32	(AES_MAX_KEYLENGTH / sizeof(u32))
+
+/*
+ * The POWER8 VSX optimized AES assembly code is borrowed from OpenSSL and
+ * inherits OpenSSL's AES_KEY format, which stores the number of rounds after
+ * the round keys.  That assembly code is difficult to change.  So for
+ * compatibility purposes we reserve space for the extra nrounds field on PPC64.
+ *
+ * Note: when prepared for decryption, the round keys are just the reversed
+ * standard round keys, not the round keys for the Equivalent Inverse Cipher.
+ */
+struct p8_aes_key {
+	u32 rndkeys[AES_MAX_KEYLENGTH_U32];
+	int nrounds;
+};
+
+union aes_enckey_arch {
+	u32 rndkeys[AES_MAX_KEYLENGTH_U32];
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES_ARCH
+#if defined(CONFIG_PPC) && defined(CONFIG_SPE)
+	/* Used unconditionally (when SPE AES code is enabled in kconfig) */
+	u32 spe_enc_key[AES_MAX_KEYLENGTH_U32] __aligned(8);
+#elif defined(CONFIG_PPC)
+	/*
+	 * Kernels that include the POWER8 VSX optimized AES code use this field
+	 * when that code is usable at key preparation time.  Otherwise they
+	 * fall back to rndkeys.  In the latter case, p8.nrounds (which doesn't
+	 * overlap rndkeys) is set to 0 to differentiate the two formats.
+	 */
+	struct p8_aes_key p8;
+#elif defined(CONFIG_S390)
+	/* Used when the CPU supports CPACF AES for this key's length */
+	u8 raw_key[AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
+#elif defined(CONFIG_SPARC64)
+	/* Used when the CPU supports the SPARC64 AES opcodes */
+	u64 sparc_rndkeys[AES_MAX_KEYLENGTH / sizeof(u64)];
+#endif
+#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES_ARCH */
+};
+
+union aes_invkey_arch {
+	u32 inv_rndkeys[AES_MAX_KEYLENGTH_U32];
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES_ARCH
+#if defined(CONFIG_PPC) && defined(CONFIG_SPE)
+	/* Used unconditionally (when SPE AES code is enabled in kconfig) */
+	u32 spe_dec_key[AES_MAX_KEYLENGTH_U32] __aligned(8);
+#elif defined(CONFIG_PPC)
+	/* Used conditionally, analogous to aes_enckey_arch::p8 */
+	struct p8_aes_key p8;
+#endif
+#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES_ARCH */
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct aes_enckey - An AES key prepared for encryption
+ * @len: Key length in bytes: 16 for AES-128, 24 for AES-192, 32 for AES-256.
+ * @nrounds: Number of rounds: 10 for AES-128, 12 for AES-192, 14 for AES-256.
+ *	     This is '6 + @len / 4' and is cached so that AES implementations
+ *	     that need it don't have to recompute it for each en/decryption.
+ * @padding: Padding to make offsetof(@k) be a multiple of 16, so that aligning
+ *	     this struct to a 16-byte boundary results in @k also being 16-byte
+ *	     aligned.  Users aren't required to align this struct to 16 bytes,
+ *	     but it may slightly improve performance.
+ * @k: This typically contains the AES round keys as an array of '@nrounds + 1'
+ *     groups of four u32 words.  However, architecture-specific implementations
+ *     of AES may store something else here, e.g. just the raw key if it's all
+ *     they need.
+ *
+ * Note that this struct is about half the size of struct aes_key.  This is
+ * separate from struct aes_key so that modes that need only AES encryption
+ * (e.g. AES-GCM, AES-CTR, AES-CMAC, tweak key in AES-XTS) don't incur the time
+ * and space overhead of computing and caching the decryption round keys.
+ *
+ * Note that there's no decryption-only equivalent (i.e. "struct aes_deckey"),
+ * since (a) it's rare that modes need decryption-only, and (b) some AES
+ * implementations use the same @k for both encryption and decryption, either
+ * always or conditionally; in the latter case both @k and @inv_k are needed.
+ */
+struct aes_enckey {
+	u32 len;
+	u32 nrounds;
+	u32 padding[2];
+	union aes_enckey_arch k;
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct aes_key - An AES key prepared for encryption and decryption
+ * @aes_enckey: Common fields and the key prepared for encryption
+ * @inv_k: This generally contains the round keys for the AES Equivalent
+ *	   Inverse Cipher, as an array of '@nrounds + 1' groups of four u32
+ *	   words.  However, architecture-specific implementations of AES may
+ *	   store something else here.  For example, they may leave this field
+ *	   uninitialized if they use @k for both encryption and decryption.
+ */
+struct aes_key {
+	struct aes_enckey; /* Include all fields of aes_enckey. */
+	union aes_invkey_arch inv_k;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Please ensure that the first two fields are 16-byte aligned
+ * relative to the start of the structure, i.e., don't move them!
+ */
+struct crypto_aes_ctx {
+	u32 key_enc[AES_MAX_KEYLENGTH_U32];
+	u32 key_dec[AES_MAX_KEYLENGTH_U32];
+	u32 key_length;
+};
+
+/*
+ * validate key length for AES algorithms
+ */
+static inline int aes_check_keylen(size_t keylen)
+{
+	switch (keylen) {
+	case AES_KEYSIZE_128:
+	case AES_KEYSIZE_192:
+	case AES_KEYSIZE_256:
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aes_expandkey - Expands the AES key as described in FIPS-197
+ * @ctx:	The location where the computed key will be stored.
+ * @in_key:	The supplied key.
+ * @key_len:	The length of the supplied key.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success. The function fails only if an invalid key size (or
+ * pointer) is supplied.
+ * The expanded key size is 240 bytes (max of 14 rounds with a unique 16 bytes
+ * key schedule plus a 16 bytes key which is used before the first round).
+ * The decryption key is prepared for the "Equivalent Inverse Cipher" as
+ * described in FIPS-197. The first slot (16 bytes) of each key (enc or dec) is
+ * for the initial combination, the second slot for the first round and so on.
+ */
+int aes_expandkey(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, const u8 *in_key,
+		  unsigned int key_len);
+
+/*
+ * The following functions are temporarily exported for use by the AES mode
+ * implementations in arch/$(SRCARCH)/crypto/.  These exports will go away when
+ * that code is migrated into lib/crypto/.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64
+int ce_aes_expandkey(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, const u8 *in_key,
+		     unsigned int key_len);
+asmlinkage void neon_aes_ecb_encrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk[],
+				     int rounds, int blocks);
+asmlinkage void neon_aes_ecb_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk[],
+				     int rounds, int blocks);
+asmlinkage void neon_aes_cbc_encrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk[],
+				     int rounds, int blocks, u8 iv[]);
+asmlinkage void neon_aes_cbc_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk[],
+				     int rounds, int blocks, u8 iv[]);
+asmlinkage void neon_aes_cbc_cts_encrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[],
+					 u32 const rk[], int rounds, int bytes,
+					 u8 const iv[]);
+asmlinkage void neon_aes_cbc_cts_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[],
+					 u32 const rk[], int rounds, int bytes,
+					 u8 const iv[]);
+asmlinkage void neon_aes_ctr_encrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk[],
+				     int rounds, int bytes, u8 ctr[]);
+asmlinkage void neon_aes_xctr_encrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk[],
+				      int rounds, int bytes, u8 ctr[],
+				      int byte_ctr);
+asmlinkage void neon_aes_xts_encrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk1[],
+				     int rounds, int bytes, u32 const rk2[],
+				     u8 iv[], int first);
+asmlinkage void neon_aes_xts_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk1[],
+				     int rounds, int bytes, u32 const rk2[],
+				     u8 iv[], int first);
+asmlinkage void neon_aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[],
+					   u32 const rk1[], int rounds,
+					   int blocks, u8 iv[],
+					   u32 const rk2[]);
+asmlinkage void neon_aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[],
+					   u32 const rk1[], int rounds,
+					   int blocks, u8 iv[],
+					   u32 const rk2[]);
+
+asmlinkage void ce_aes_ecb_encrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk[],
+				   int rounds, int blocks);
+asmlinkage void ce_aes_ecb_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk[],
+				   int rounds, int blocks);
+asmlinkage void ce_aes_cbc_encrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk[],
+				   int rounds, int blocks, u8 iv[]);
+asmlinkage void ce_aes_cbc_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk[],
+				   int rounds, int blocks, u8 iv[]);
+asmlinkage void ce_aes_cbc_cts_encrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk[],
+				       int rounds, int bytes, u8 const iv[]);
+asmlinkage void ce_aes_cbc_cts_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk[],
+				       int rounds, int bytes, u8 const iv[]);
+asmlinkage void ce_aes_ctr_encrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk[],
+				   int rounds, int bytes, u8 ctr[]);
+asmlinkage void ce_aes_xctr_encrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk[],
+				    int rounds, int bytes, u8 ctr[],
+				    int byte_ctr);
+asmlinkage void ce_aes_xts_encrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk1[],
+				   int rounds, int bytes, u32 const rk2[],
+				   u8 iv[], int first);
+asmlinkage void ce_aes_xts_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[], u32 const rk1[],
+				   int rounds, int bytes, u32 const rk2[],
+				   u8 iv[], int first);
+asmlinkage void ce_aes_essiv_cbc_encrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[],
+					 u32 const rk1[], int rounds,
+					 int blocks, u8 iv[], u32 const rk2[]);
+asmlinkage void ce_aes_essiv_cbc_decrypt(u8 out[], u8 const in[],
+					 u32 const rk1[], int rounds,
+					 int blocks, u8 iv[], u32 const rk2[]);
+asmlinkage void ce_aes_mac_update(u8 const in[], u32 const rk[], int rounds,
+				  size_t blocks, u8 dg[], int enc_before,
+				  int enc_after);
+#elif defined(CONFIG_PPC)
+void ppc_expand_key_128(u32 *key_enc, const u8 *key);
+void ppc_expand_key_192(u32 *key_enc, const u8 *key);
+void ppc_expand_key_256(u32 *key_enc, const u8 *key);
+void ppc_generate_decrypt_key(u32 *key_dec, u32 *key_enc, unsigned int key_len);
+void ppc_encrypt_ecb(u8 *out, const u8 *in, u32 *key_enc, u32 rounds,
+		     u32 bytes);
+void ppc_decrypt_ecb(u8 *out, const u8 *in, u32 *key_dec, u32 rounds,
+		     u32 bytes);
+void ppc_encrypt_cbc(u8 *out, const u8 *in, u32 *key_enc, u32 rounds, u32 bytes,
+		     u8 *iv);
+void ppc_decrypt_cbc(u8 *out, const u8 *in, u32 *key_dec, u32 rounds, u32 bytes,
+		     u8 *iv);
+void ppc_crypt_ctr(u8 *out, const u8 *in, u32 *key_enc, u32 rounds, u32 bytes,
+		   u8 *iv);
+void ppc_encrypt_xts(u8 *out, const u8 *in, u32 *key_enc, u32 rounds, u32 bytes,
+		     u8 *iv, u32 *key_twk);
+void ppc_decrypt_xts(u8 *out, const u8 *in, u32 *key_dec, u32 rounds, u32 bytes,
+		     u8 *iv, u32 *key_twk);
+int aes_p8_set_encrypt_key(const u8 *userKey, const int bits,
+			   struct p8_aes_key *key);
+int aes_p8_set_decrypt_key(const u8 *userKey, const int bits,
+			   struct p8_aes_key *key);
+void aes_p8_encrypt(const u8 *in, u8 *out, const struct p8_aes_key *key);
+void aes_p8_decrypt(const u8 *in, u8 *out, const struct p8_aes_key *key);
+void aes_p8_cbc_encrypt(const u8 *in, u8 *out, size_t len,
+			const struct p8_aes_key *key, u8 *iv, bool enc);
+void aes_p8_ctr32_encrypt_blocks(const u8 *in, u8 *out, size_t len,
+				 const struct p8_aes_key *key, const u8 *iv);
+void aes_p8_xts_encrypt(const u8 *in, u8 *out, size_t len,
+			const struct p8_aes_key *key1,
+			const struct p8_aes_key *key2, u8 *iv);
+void aes_p8_xts_decrypt(const u8 *in, u8 *out, size_t len,
+			const struct p8_aes_key *key1,
+			const struct p8_aes_key *key2, u8 *iv);
+#elif defined(CONFIG_SPARC64)
+void aes_sparc64_key_expand(const u32 *in_key, u64 *output_key,
+			    unsigned int key_len);
+void aes_sparc64_load_encrypt_keys_128(const u64 *key);
+void aes_sparc64_load_encrypt_keys_192(const u64 *key);
+void aes_sparc64_load_encrypt_keys_256(const u64 *key);
+void aes_sparc64_load_decrypt_keys_128(const u64 *key);
+void aes_sparc64_load_decrypt_keys_192(const u64 *key);
+void aes_sparc64_load_decrypt_keys_256(const u64 *key);
+void aes_sparc64_ecb_encrypt_128(const u64 *key, const u64 *input, u64 *output,
+				 unsigned int len);
+void aes_sparc64_ecb_encrypt_192(const u64 *key, const u64 *input, u64 *output,
+				 unsigned int len);
+void aes_sparc64_ecb_encrypt_256(const u64 *key, const u64 *input, u64 *output,
+				 unsigned int len);
+void aes_sparc64_ecb_decrypt_128(const u64 *key, const u64 *input, u64 *output,
+				 unsigned int len);
+void aes_sparc64_ecb_decrypt_192(const u64 *key, const u64 *input, u64 *output,
+				 unsigned int len);
+void aes_sparc64_ecb_decrypt_256(const u64 *key, const u64 *input, u64 *output,
+				 unsigned int len);
+void aes_sparc64_cbc_encrypt_128(const u64 *key, const u64 *input, u64 *output,
+				 unsigned int len, u64 *iv);
+void aes_sparc64_cbc_encrypt_192(const u64 *key, const u64 *input, u64 *output,
+				 unsigned int len, u64 *iv);
+void aes_sparc64_cbc_encrypt_256(const u64 *key, const u64 *input, u64 *output,
+				 unsigned int len, u64 *iv);
+void aes_sparc64_cbc_decrypt_128(const u64 *key, const u64 *input, u64 *output,
+				 unsigned int len, u64 *iv);
+void aes_sparc64_cbc_decrypt_192(const u64 *key, const u64 *input, u64 *output,
+				 unsigned int len, u64 *iv);
+void aes_sparc64_cbc_decrypt_256(const u64 *key, const u64 *input, u64 *output,
+				 unsigned int len, u64 *iv);
+void aes_sparc64_ctr_crypt_128(const u64 *key, const u64 *input, u64 *output,
+			       unsigned int len, u64 *iv);
+void aes_sparc64_ctr_crypt_192(const u64 *key, const u64 *input, u64 *output,
+			       unsigned int len, u64 *iv);
+void aes_sparc64_ctr_crypt_256(const u64 *key, const u64 *input, u64 *output,
+			       unsigned int len, u64 *iv);
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * aes_preparekey() - Prepare an AES key for encryption and decryption
+ * @key: (output) The key structure to initialize
+ * @in_key: The raw AES key
+ * @key_len: Length of the raw key in bytes.  Should be either AES_KEYSIZE_128,
+ *	     AES_KEYSIZE_192, or AES_KEYSIZE_256.
+ *
+ * This prepares an AES key for both the encryption and decryption directions of
+ * the block cipher.  Typically this involves expanding the raw key into both
+ * the standard round keys and the Equivalent Inverse Cipher round keys, but
+ * some architecture-specific implementations don't do the full expansion here.
+ *
+ * The caller is responsible for zeroizing both the struct aes_key and the raw
+ * key once they are no longer needed.
+ *
+ * If you don't need decryption support, use aes_prepareenckey() instead.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success or -EINVAL if the given key length is invalid.  No other
+ *	   errors are possible, so callers that always pass a valid key length
+ *	   don't need to check for errors.
+ *
+ * Context: Any context.
+ */
+int aes_preparekey(struct aes_key *key, const u8 *in_key, size_t key_len);
+
+/**
+ * aes_prepareenckey() - Prepare an AES key for encryption-only
+ * @key: (output) The key structure to initialize
+ * @in_key: The raw AES key
+ * @key_len: Length of the raw key in bytes.  Should be either AES_KEYSIZE_128,
+ *	     AES_KEYSIZE_192, or AES_KEYSIZE_256.
+ *
+ * This prepares an AES key for only the encryption direction of the block
+ * cipher.  Typically this involves expanding the raw key into only the standard
+ * round keys, resulting in a struct about half the size of struct aes_key.
+ *
+ * The caller is responsible for zeroizing both the struct aes_enckey and the
+ * raw key once they are no longer needed.
+ *
+ * Note that while the resulting prepared key supports only AES encryption, it
+ * can still be used for decrypting in a mode of operation that uses AES in only
+ * the encryption (forward) direction, for example counter mode.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success or -EINVAL if the given key length is invalid.  No other
+ *	   errors are possible, so callers that always pass a valid key length
+ *	   don't need to check for errors.
+ *
+ * Context: Any context.
+ */
+int aes_prepareenckey(struct aes_enckey *key, const u8 *in_key, size_t key_len);
+
+typedef union {
+	const struct aes_enckey *enc_key;
+	const struct aes_key *full_key;
+} aes_encrypt_arg __attribute__ ((__transparent_union__));
+
+/**
+ * aes_encrypt() - Encrypt a single AES block
+ * @key: The AES key, as a pointer to either an encryption-only key
+ *	 (struct aes_enckey) or a full, bidirectional key (struct aes_key).
+ * @out: Buffer to store the ciphertext block
+ * @in: Buffer containing the plaintext block
+ *
+ * Context: Any context.
+ */
+void aes_encrypt(aes_encrypt_arg key, u8 out[at_least AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
+		 const u8 in[at_least AES_BLOCK_SIZE]);
+
+/**
+ * aes_decrypt() - Decrypt a single AES block
+ * @key: The AES key, previously initialized by aes_preparekey()
+ * @out: Buffer to store the plaintext block
+ * @in: Buffer containing the ciphertext block
+ *
+ * Context: Any context.
+ */
+void aes_decrypt(const struct aes_key *key, u8 out[at_least AES_BLOCK_SIZE],
+		 const u8 in[at_least AES_BLOCK_SIZE]);
+
+extern const u8 crypto_aes_sbox[];
+extern const u8 crypto_aes_inv_sbox[];
+extern const u32 aes_enc_tab[256];
+extern const u32 aes_dec_tab[256];
+
+void aescfb_encrypt(const struct aes_enckey *key, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+		    int len, const u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]);
+void aescfb_decrypt(const struct aes_enckey *key, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
+		    int len, const u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]);
+
+#endif