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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/asm-generic/flat.h
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staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/asm-generic/flat.h')
-rw-r--r--include/asm-generic/flat.h26
1 files changed, 26 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/flat.h b/include/asm-generic/flat.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1928a3596
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/asm-generic/flat.h
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _ASM_GENERIC_FLAT_H
+#define _ASM_GENERIC_FLAT_H
+
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+
+static inline int flat_get_addr_from_rp(u32 __user *rp, u32 relval, u32 flags,
+ u32 *addr)
+{
+#ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
+ return copy_from_user(addr, rp, 4) ? -EFAULT : 0;
+#else
+ return get_user(*addr, rp);
+#endif
+}
+
+static inline int flat_put_addr_at_rp(u32 __user *rp, u32 addr, u32 rel)
+{
+#ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
+ return copy_to_user(rp, &addr, 4) ? -EFAULT : 0;
+#else
+ return put_user(addr, rp);
+#endif
+}
+
+#endif /* _ASM_GENERIC_FLAT_H */