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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/asm-generic/error-injection.h
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staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/asm-generic/error-injection.h')
-rw-r--r--include/asm-generic/error-injection.h43
1 files changed, 43 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/error-injection.h b/include/asm-generic/error-injection.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b05253f68
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/asm-generic/error-injection.h
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _ASM_GENERIC_ERROR_INJECTION_H
+#define _ASM_GENERIC_ERROR_INJECTION_H
+
+#if defined(__KERNEL__) && !defined(__ASSEMBLY__)
+enum {
+ EI_ETYPE_NULL, /* Return NULL if failure */
+ EI_ETYPE_ERRNO, /* Return -ERRNO if failure */
+ EI_ETYPE_ERRNO_NULL, /* Return -ERRNO or NULL if failure */
+ EI_ETYPE_TRUE, /* Return true if failure */
+};
+
+struct error_injection_entry {
+ unsigned long addr;
+ int etype;
+};
+
+struct pt_regs;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION
+/*
+ * Whitelist generating macro. Specify functions which can be error-injectable
+ * using this macro. If you unsure what is required for the error-injectable
+ * functions, please read Documentation/fault-injection/fault-injection.rst
+ * 'Error Injectable Functions' section.
+ */
+#define ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION(fname, _etype) \
+static struct error_injection_entry __used \
+ __section("_error_injection_whitelist") \
+ _eil_addr_##fname = { \
+ .addr = (unsigned long)fname, \
+ .etype = EI_ETYPE_##_etype, \
+ }
+
+void override_function_with_return(struct pt_regs *regs);
+#else
+#define ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION(fname, _etype)
+
+static inline void override_function_with_return(struct pt_regs *regs) { }
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _ASM_GENERIC_ERROR_INJECTION_H */