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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/asm-generic/error-injection.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/asm-generic/error-injection.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/asm-generic/error-injection.h | 43 |
1 files changed, 43 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/error-injection.h b/include/asm-generic/error-injection.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b05253f68 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/asm-generic/error-injection.h @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef _ASM_GENERIC_ERROR_INJECTION_H +#define _ASM_GENERIC_ERROR_INJECTION_H + +#if defined(__KERNEL__) && !defined(__ASSEMBLY__) +enum { + EI_ETYPE_NULL, /* Return NULL if failure */ + EI_ETYPE_ERRNO, /* Return -ERRNO if failure */ + EI_ETYPE_ERRNO_NULL, /* Return -ERRNO or NULL if failure */ + EI_ETYPE_TRUE, /* Return true if failure */ +}; + +struct error_injection_entry { + unsigned long addr; + int etype; +}; + +struct pt_regs; + +#ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION +/* + * Whitelist generating macro. Specify functions which can be error-injectable + * using this macro. If you unsure what is required for the error-injectable + * functions, please read Documentation/fault-injection/fault-injection.rst + * 'Error Injectable Functions' section. + */ +#define ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION(fname, _etype) \ +static struct error_injection_entry __used \ + __section("_error_injection_whitelist") \ + _eil_addr_##fname = { \ + .addr = (unsigned long)fname, \ + .etype = EI_ETYPE_##_etype, \ + } + +void override_function_with_return(struct pt_regs *regs); +#else +#define ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION(fname, _etype) + +static inline void override_function_with_return(struct pt_regs *regs) { } +#endif +#endif + +#endif /* _ASM_GENERIC_ERROR_INJECTION_H */ |
