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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/acpi/apei.h
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staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/acpi/apei.h')
-rw-r--r--include/acpi/apei.h57
1 files changed, 57 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/acpi/apei.h b/include/acpi/apei.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dc60f7db5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/acpi/apei.h
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * apei.h - ACPI Platform Error Interface
+ */
+
+#ifndef ACPI_APEI_H
+#define ACPI_APEI_H
+
+#include <linux/acpi.h>
+#include <linux/cper.h>
+#include <asm/ioctls.h>
+
+#define APEI_ERST_INVALID_RECORD_ID 0xffffffffffffffffULL
+
+#define APEI_ERST_CLEAR_RECORD _IOW('E', 1, u64)
+#define APEI_ERST_GET_RECORD_COUNT _IOR('E', 2, u32)
+
+#ifdef __KERNEL__
+
+enum hest_status {
+ HEST_ENABLED,
+ HEST_DISABLED,
+ HEST_NOT_FOUND,
+};
+
+extern int hest_disable;
+extern int erst_disable;
+#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI_APEI_GHES
+extern bool ghes_disable;
+void __init acpi_ghes_init(void);
+#else
+#define ghes_disable 1
+static inline void acpi_ghes_init(void) { }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI_APEI
+void __init acpi_hest_init(void);
+#else
+static inline void acpi_hest_init(void) { }
+#endif
+
+int erst_write(const struct cper_record_header *record);
+ssize_t erst_get_record_count(void);
+int erst_get_record_id_begin(int *pos);
+int erst_get_record_id_next(int *pos, u64 *record_id);
+void erst_get_record_id_end(void);
+ssize_t erst_read(u64 record_id, struct cper_record_header *record,
+ size_t buflen);
+ssize_t erst_read_record(u64 record_id, struct cper_record_header *record,
+ size_t buflen, size_t recordlen, const guid_t *creatorid);
+int erst_clear(u64 record_id);
+
+int arch_apei_enable_cmcff(struct acpi_hest_header *hest_hdr, void *data);
+void arch_apei_report_mem_error(int sev, struct cper_sec_mem_err *mem_err);
+
+#endif
+#endif