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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /include/acpi/apei.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/acpi/apei.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/acpi/apei.h | 57 |
1 files changed, 57 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/acpi/apei.h b/include/acpi/apei.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..dc60f7db5 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/acpi/apei.h @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * apei.h - ACPI Platform Error Interface + */ + +#ifndef ACPI_APEI_H +#define ACPI_APEI_H + +#include <linux/acpi.h> +#include <linux/cper.h> +#include <asm/ioctls.h> + +#define APEI_ERST_INVALID_RECORD_ID 0xffffffffffffffffULL + +#define APEI_ERST_CLEAR_RECORD _IOW('E', 1, u64) +#define APEI_ERST_GET_RECORD_COUNT _IOR('E', 2, u32) + +#ifdef __KERNEL__ + +enum hest_status { + HEST_ENABLED, + HEST_DISABLED, + HEST_NOT_FOUND, +}; + +extern int hest_disable; +extern int erst_disable; +#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI_APEI_GHES +extern bool ghes_disable; +void __init acpi_ghes_init(void); +#else +#define ghes_disable 1 +static inline void acpi_ghes_init(void) { } +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI_APEI +void __init acpi_hest_init(void); +#else +static inline void acpi_hest_init(void) { } +#endif + +int erst_write(const struct cper_record_header *record); +ssize_t erst_get_record_count(void); +int erst_get_record_id_begin(int *pos); +int erst_get_record_id_next(int *pos, u64 *record_id); +void erst_get_record_id_end(void); +ssize_t erst_read(u64 record_id, struct cper_record_header *record, + size_t buflen); +ssize_t erst_read_record(u64 record_id, struct cper_record_header *record, + size_t buflen, size_t recordlen, const guid_t *creatorid); +int erst_clear(u64 record_id); + +int arch_apei_enable_cmcff(struct acpi_hest_header *hest_hdr, void *data); +void arch_apei_report_mem_error(int sev, struct cper_sec_mem_err *mem_err); + +#endif +#endif |
