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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /fs/verity/init.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/verity/init.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/verity/init.c | 70 |
1 files changed, 70 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/verity/init.c b/fs/verity/init.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3aa55dec8 --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/verity/init.c @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * fs-verity module initialization and logging + * + * Copyright 2019 Google LLC + */ + +#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS +#include "fsverity_private.h" + +#include <linux/ratelimit.h> + +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL +static const struct ctl_table fsverity_sysctl_table[] = { +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES + { + .procname = "require_signatures", + .data = &fsverity_require_signatures, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, + .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE, + }, +#endif +}; + +static void __init fsverity_init_sysctl(void) +{ + register_sysctl_init("fs/verity", fsverity_sysctl_table); +} +#else /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ +static inline void fsverity_init_sysctl(void) +{ +} +#endif /* !CONFIG_SYSCTL */ + +void fsverity_msg(const struct inode *inode, const char *level, + const char *fmt, ...) +{ + static DEFINE_RATELIMIT_STATE(rs, DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_INTERVAL, + DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_BURST); + struct va_format vaf; + va_list args; + + if (!__ratelimit(&rs)) + return; + + va_start(args, fmt); + vaf.fmt = fmt; + vaf.va = &args; + if (inode) + printk("%sfs-verity (%s, inode %llu): %pV\n", + level, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, &vaf); + else + printk("%sfs-verity: %pV\n", level, &vaf); + va_end(args); +} + +static int __init fsverity_init(void) +{ + fsverity_check_hash_algs(); + fsverity_init_info_cache(); + fsverity_init_workqueue(); + fsverity_init_sysctl(); + fsverity_init_signature(); + fsverity_init_bpf(); + return 0; +} +late_initcall(fsverity_init) |
