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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /fs/unicode/utf8n.h
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staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/unicode/utf8n.h')
-rw-r--r--fs/unicode/utf8n.h83
1 files changed, 83 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/unicode/utf8n.h b/fs/unicode/utf8n.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fc703aa4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/unicode/utf8n.h
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 SGI.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+#ifndef UTF8NORM_H
+#define UTF8NORM_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/unicode.h>
+
+int utf8version_is_supported(const struct unicode_map *um, unsigned int version);
+
+/*
+ * Determine the length of the normalized from of the string,
+ * excluding any terminating NULL byte.
+ * Returns 0 if only ignorable code points are present.
+ * Returns -1 if the input is not valid UTF-8.
+ */
+ssize_t utf8nlen(const struct unicode_map *um, enum utf8_normalization n,
+ const char *s, size_t len);
+
+/* Needed in struct utf8cursor below. */
+#define UTF8HANGULLEAF (12)
+
+/*
+ * Cursor structure used by the normalizer.
+ */
+struct utf8cursor {
+ const struct unicode_map *um;
+ enum utf8_normalization n;
+ const char *s;
+ const char *p;
+ const char *ss;
+ const char *sp;
+ unsigned int len;
+ unsigned int slen;
+ short int ccc;
+ short int nccc;
+ unsigned char hangul[UTF8HANGULLEAF];
+};
+
+/*
+ * Initialize a utf8cursor to normalize a string.
+ * Returns 0 on success.
+ * Returns -1 on failure.
+ */
+int utf8ncursor(struct utf8cursor *u8c, const struct unicode_map *um,
+ enum utf8_normalization n, const char *s, size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * Get the next byte in the normalization.
+ * Returns a value > 0 && < 256 on success.
+ * Returns 0 when the end of the normalization is reached.
+ * Returns -1 if the string being normalized is not valid UTF-8.
+ */
+extern int utf8byte(struct utf8cursor *u8c);
+
+struct utf8data {
+ unsigned int maxage;
+ unsigned int offset;
+};
+
+struct utf8data_table {
+ const unsigned int *utf8agetab;
+ int utf8agetab_size;
+
+ const struct utf8data *utf8nfdicfdata;
+ int utf8nfdicfdata_size;
+
+ const struct utf8data *utf8nfdidata;
+ int utf8nfdidata_size;
+
+ const unsigned char *utf8data;
+};
+
+extern const struct utf8data_table utf8_data_table;
+
+#endif /* UTF8NORM_H */