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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /fs/unicode/utf8n.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/unicode/utf8n.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/unicode/utf8n.h | 83 |
1 files changed, 83 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/unicode/utf8n.h b/fs/unicode/utf8n.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fc703aa4b --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/unicode/utf8n.h @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2014 SGI. + * All rights reserved. + */ + +#ifndef UTF8NORM_H +#define UTF8NORM_H + +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/export.h> +#include <linux/string.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/unicode.h> + +int utf8version_is_supported(const struct unicode_map *um, unsigned int version); + +/* + * Determine the length of the normalized from of the string, + * excluding any terminating NULL byte. + * Returns 0 if only ignorable code points are present. + * Returns -1 if the input is not valid UTF-8. + */ +ssize_t utf8nlen(const struct unicode_map *um, enum utf8_normalization n, + const char *s, size_t len); + +/* Needed in struct utf8cursor below. */ +#define UTF8HANGULLEAF (12) + +/* + * Cursor structure used by the normalizer. + */ +struct utf8cursor { + const struct unicode_map *um; + enum utf8_normalization n; + const char *s; + const char *p; + const char *ss; + const char *sp; + unsigned int len; + unsigned int slen; + short int ccc; + short int nccc; + unsigned char hangul[UTF8HANGULLEAF]; +}; + +/* + * Initialize a utf8cursor to normalize a string. + * Returns 0 on success. + * Returns -1 on failure. + */ +int utf8ncursor(struct utf8cursor *u8c, const struct unicode_map *um, + enum utf8_normalization n, const char *s, size_t len); + +/* + * Get the next byte in the normalization. + * Returns a value > 0 && < 256 on success. + * Returns 0 when the end of the normalization is reached. + * Returns -1 if the string being normalized is not valid UTF-8. + */ +extern int utf8byte(struct utf8cursor *u8c); + +struct utf8data { + unsigned int maxage; + unsigned int offset; +}; + +struct utf8data_table { + const unsigned int *utf8agetab; + int utf8agetab_size; + + const struct utf8data *utf8nfdicfdata; + int utf8nfdicfdata_size; + + const struct utf8data *utf8nfdidata; + int utf8nfdidata_size; + + const unsigned char *utf8data; +}; + +extern const struct utf8data_table utf8_data_table; + +#endif /* UTF8NORM_H */ |
