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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /fs/tests/exec_kunit.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
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staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/tests/exec_kunit.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/tests/exec_kunit.c132
1 files changed, 132 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/tests/exec_kunit.c b/fs/tests/exec_kunit.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1c32cac09
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/tests/exec_kunit.c
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#include <kunit/test.h>
+
+struct bprm_stack_limits_result {
+ struct linux_binprm bprm;
+ int expected_rc;
+ unsigned long expected_argmin;
+};
+
+static const struct bprm_stack_limits_result bprm_stack_limits_results[] = {
+ /* Negative argc/envc counts produce -E2BIG */
+ { { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ULONG_MAX,
+ .argc = INT_MIN, .envc = INT_MIN }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
+ { { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ULONG_MAX,
+ .argc = 5, .envc = -1 }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
+ { { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ULONG_MAX,
+ .argc = -1, .envc = 10 }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
+ /* The max value of argc or envc is MAX_ARG_STRINGS. */
+ { { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ULONG_MAX,
+ .argc = INT_MAX, .envc = INT_MAX }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
+ { { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ULONG_MAX,
+ .argc = MAX_ARG_STRINGS, .envc = MAX_ARG_STRINGS }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
+ { { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ULONG_MAX,
+ .argc = 0, .envc = MAX_ARG_STRINGS }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
+ { { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ULONG_MAX,
+ .argc = MAX_ARG_STRINGS, .envc = 0 }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
+ /*
+ * On 32-bit system these argc and envc counts, while likely impossible
+ * to represent within the associated TASK_SIZE, could overflow the
+ * limit calculation, and bypass the ptr_size <= limit check.
+ */
+ { { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ULONG_MAX,
+ .argc = 0x20000001, .envc = 0x20000001 }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
+#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
+ /* Make sure a pathological bprm->p doesn't cause an overflow. */
+ { { .p = sizeof(void *), .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ULONG_MAX,
+ .argc = 10, .envc = 10 }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
+#endif
+ /*
+ * 0 rlim_stack will get raised to ARG_MAX. With 1 string pointer,
+ * we should see p - ARG_MAX + sizeof(void *).
+ */
+ { { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = 0,
+ .argc = 1, .envc = 0 }, .expected_argmin = ULONG_MAX - ARG_MAX + sizeof(void *)},
+ /* Validate that argc is always raised to a minimum of 1. */
+ { { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = 0,
+ .argc = 0, .envc = 0 }, .expected_argmin = ULONG_MAX - ARG_MAX + sizeof(void *)},
+ /*
+ * 0 rlim_stack will get raised to ARG_MAX. With pointers filling ARG_MAX,
+ * we should see -E2BIG. (Note argc is always raised to at least 1.)
+ */
+ { { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = 0,
+ .argc = ARG_MAX / sizeof(void *), .envc = 0 }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
+ { { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = 0,
+ .argc = 0, .envc = ARG_MAX / sizeof(void *) - 1 }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
+ { { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = 0,
+ .argc = ARG_MAX / sizeof(void *) + 1, .envc = 0 }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
+ { { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = 0,
+ .argc = 0, .envc = ARG_MAX / sizeof(void *) }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
+ /* And with one less, we see space for exactly 1 pointer. */
+ { { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = 0,
+ .argc = (ARG_MAX / sizeof(void *)) - 1, .envc = 0 },
+ .expected_argmin = ULONG_MAX - sizeof(void *) },
+ { { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = 0,
+ .argc = 0, .envc = (ARG_MAX / sizeof(void *)) - 2, },
+ .expected_argmin = ULONG_MAX - sizeof(void *) },
+ /* If we raise rlim_stack / 4 to exactly ARG_MAX, nothing changes. */
+ { { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ARG_MAX * 4,
+ .argc = ARG_MAX / sizeof(void *), .envc = 0 }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
+ { { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ARG_MAX * 4,
+ .argc = 0, .envc = ARG_MAX / sizeof(void *) - 1 }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
+ { { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ARG_MAX * 4,
+ .argc = ARG_MAX / sizeof(void *) + 1, .envc = 0 }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
+ { { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ARG_MAX * 4,
+ .argc = 0, .envc = ARG_MAX / sizeof(void *) }, .expected_rc = -E2BIG },
+ { { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ARG_MAX * 4,
+ .argc = (ARG_MAX / sizeof(void *)) - 1, .envc = 0 },
+ .expected_argmin = ULONG_MAX - sizeof(void *) },
+ { { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = ARG_MAX * 4,
+ .argc = 0, .envc = (ARG_MAX / sizeof(void *)) - 2, },
+ .expected_argmin = ULONG_MAX - sizeof(void *) },
+ /* But raising it another pointer * 4 will provide space for 1 more pointer. */
+ { { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = (ARG_MAX + sizeof(void *)) * 4,
+ .argc = ARG_MAX / sizeof(void *), .envc = 0 },
+ .expected_argmin = ULONG_MAX - sizeof(void *) },
+ { { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = (ARG_MAX + sizeof(void *)) * 4,
+ .argc = 0, .envc = ARG_MAX / sizeof(void *) - 1 },
+ .expected_argmin = ULONG_MAX - sizeof(void *) },
+ /* Raising rlim_stack / 4 to _STK_LIM / 4 * 3 will see more space. */
+ { { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = 4 * (_STK_LIM / 4 * 3),
+ .argc = 0, .envc = 0 },
+ .expected_argmin = ULONG_MAX - (_STK_LIM / 4 * 3) + sizeof(void *) },
+ /* But raising it any further will see no increase. */
+ { { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = 4 * (_STK_LIM / 4 * 3 + sizeof(void *)),
+ .argc = 0, .envc = 0 },
+ .expected_argmin = ULONG_MAX - (_STK_LIM / 4 * 3) + sizeof(void *) },
+ { { .p = ULONG_MAX, .rlim_stack.rlim_cur = 4 * _STK_LIM,
+ .argc = 0, .envc = 0 },
+ .expected_argmin = ULONG_MAX - (_STK_LIM / 4 * 3) + sizeof(void *) },
+};
+
+static void exec_test_bprm_stack_limits(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ /* Double-check the constants. */
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, _STK_LIM, SZ_8M);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, ARG_MAX, 32 * SZ_4K);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, MAX_ARG_STRINGS, 0x7FFFFFFF);
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(bprm_stack_limits_results); i++) {
+ const struct bprm_stack_limits_result *result = &bprm_stack_limits_results[i];
+ struct linux_binprm bprm = result->bprm;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = bprm_stack_limits(&bprm);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ_MSG(test, rc, result->expected_rc, "on loop %d", i);
+#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ_MSG(test, bprm.argmin, result->expected_argmin, "on loop %d", i);
+#endif
+ }
+}
+
+static struct kunit_case exec_test_cases[] = {
+ KUNIT_CASE(exec_test_bprm_stack_limits),
+ {},
+};
+
+static struct kunit_suite exec_test_suite = {
+ .name = "exec",
+ .test_cases = exec_test_cases,
+};
+
+kunit_test_suite(exec_test_suite);