summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/fs/smb/server/misc.h
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /fs/smb/server/misc.h
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/smb/server/misc.h')
-rw-r--r--fs/smb/server/misc.h63
1 files changed, 63 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/smb/server/misc.h b/fs/smb/server/misc.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1faaddd0f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/smb/server/misc.h
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __KSMBD_MISC_H__
+#define __KSMBD_MISC_H__
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
+#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
+#endif
+struct ksmbd_share_config;
+struct nls_table;
+struct kstat;
+struct ksmbd_file;
+
+int match_pattern(const char *str, size_t len, const char *pattern);
+int ksmbd_validate_filename(char *filename);
+int parse_stream_name(char *filename, char **stream_name, int *s_type);
+char *convert_to_nt_pathname(struct ksmbd_share_config *share,
+ const struct path *path);
+int get_nlink(struct kstat *st);
+void ksmbd_conv_path_to_unix(char *path);
+void ksmbd_strip_last_slash(char *path);
+void ksmbd_conv_path_to_windows(char *path);
+char *ksmbd_casefold_sharename(struct unicode_map *um, const char *name);
+char *ksmbd_extract_sharename(struct unicode_map *um, const char *treename);
+
+#define KSMBD_DIR_INFO_ALIGNMENT 8
+struct ksmbd_dir_info;
+char *ksmbd_convert_dir_info_name(struct ksmbd_dir_info *d_info,
+ const struct nls_table *local_nls,
+ int *conv_len);
+
+#define NTFS_TIME_OFFSET ((u64)(369 * 365 + 89) * 24 * 3600 * 10000000)
+struct timespec64 ksmbd_NTtimeToUnix(__le64 ntutc);
+u64 ksmbd_UnixTimeToNT(struct timespec64 t);
+long long ksmbd_systime(void);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
+struct ksmbd_const_name {
+ unsigned int const_value;
+ const char *name;
+};
+
+int ksmbd_proc_init(void);
+void ksmbd_proc_cleanup(void);
+void ksmbd_proc_reset(void);
+struct proc_dir_entry *ksmbd_proc_create(const char *name,
+ int (*show)(struct seq_file *m, void *v),
+ void *v);
+void ksmbd_proc_show_flag_names(struct seq_file *m,
+ const struct ksmbd_const_name *table,
+ int count,
+ unsigned int flags);
+const char *ksmbd_proc_const_name(const struct ksmbd_const_name *table,
+ int count, unsigned int const_value);
+#else
+static inline int ksmbd_proc_init(void) { return 0; }
+static inline void ksmbd_proc_cleanup(void) {}
+static inline void ksmbd_proc_reset(void) {}
+#endif
+#endif /* __KSMBD_MISC_H__ */