diff options
| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /fs/smb/server/misc.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/smb/server/misc.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/smb/server/misc.h | 63 |
1 files changed, 63 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/smb/server/misc.h b/fs/smb/server/misc.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1faaddd0f --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/smb/server/misc.h @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2018 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. + */ + +#ifndef __KSMBD_MISC_H__ +#define __KSMBD_MISC_H__ + +#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS +#include <linux/proc_fs.h> +#endif +struct ksmbd_share_config; +struct nls_table; +struct kstat; +struct ksmbd_file; + +int match_pattern(const char *str, size_t len, const char *pattern); +int ksmbd_validate_filename(char *filename); +int parse_stream_name(char *filename, char **stream_name, int *s_type); +char *convert_to_nt_pathname(struct ksmbd_share_config *share, + const struct path *path); +int get_nlink(struct kstat *st); +void ksmbd_conv_path_to_unix(char *path); +void ksmbd_strip_last_slash(char *path); +void ksmbd_conv_path_to_windows(char *path); +char *ksmbd_casefold_sharename(struct unicode_map *um, const char *name); +char *ksmbd_extract_sharename(struct unicode_map *um, const char *treename); + +#define KSMBD_DIR_INFO_ALIGNMENT 8 +struct ksmbd_dir_info; +char *ksmbd_convert_dir_info_name(struct ksmbd_dir_info *d_info, + const struct nls_table *local_nls, + int *conv_len); + +#define NTFS_TIME_OFFSET ((u64)(369 * 365 + 89) * 24 * 3600 * 10000000) +struct timespec64 ksmbd_NTtimeToUnix(__le64 ntutc); +u64 ksmbd_UnixTimeToNT(struct timespec64 t); +long long ksmbd_systime(void); + +#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS +struct ksmbd_const_name { + unsigned int const_value; + const char *name; +}; + +int ksmbd_proc_init(void); +void ksmbd_proc_cleanup(void); +void ksmbd_proc_reset(void); +struct proc_dir_entry *ksmbd_proc_create(const char *name, + int (*show)(struct seq_file *m, void *v), + void *v); +void ksmbd_proc_show_flag_names(struct seq_file *m, + const struct ksmbd_const_name *table, + int count, + unsigned int flags); +const char *ksmbd_proc_const_name(const struct ksmbd_const_name *table, + int count, unsigned int const_value); +#else +static inline int ksmbd_proc_init(void) { return 0; } +static inline void ksmbd_proc_cleanup(void) {} +static inline void ksmbd_proc_reset(void) {} +#endif +#endif /* __KSMBD_MISC_H__ */ |
