staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 74 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/fs/smb/server/auth.h b/fs/smb/server/auth.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7ce9c42d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/smb/server/auth.h
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
+/*
+ *   Copyright (C) 2018 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AUTH_H__
+#define __AUTH_H__
+
+#include "ntlmssp.h"
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMB_SERVER_KERBEROS5
+#define AUTH_GSS_LENGTH		96
+#define AUTH_GSS_PADDING	0
+#else
+#define AUTH_GSS_LENGTH		74
+#define AUTH_GSS_PADDING	6
+#endif
+
+#define CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE	(16)
+#define CIFS_NTHASH_SIZE	(16)
+
+/*
+ * Size of the ntlm client response
+ */
+#define CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE		24
+#define CIFS_SMB1_SIGNATURE_SIZE	8
+#define CIFS_SMB1_SESSKEY_SIZE		16
+
+#define KSMBD_AUTH_NTLMSSP	0x0001
+#define KSMBD_AUTH_KRB5		0x0002
+#define KSMBD_AUTH_MSKRB5	0x0004
+#define KSMBD_AUTH_KRB5U2U	0x0008
+
+struct ksmbd_session;
+struct ksmbd_conn;
+struct ksmbd_work;
+struct kvec;
+
+int ksmbd_crypt_message(struct ksmbd_work *work, struct kvec *iov,
+			unsigned int nvec, int enc);
+int ksmbd_crypt_rdma(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, const u8 *key,
+		     void *buf, unsigned int buflen, const u8 *nonce,
+		     unsigned int nonce_len, u8 *tag, unsigned int tag_len,
+		     bool enc);
+void ksmbd_copy_gss_neg_header(void *buf);
+int ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, struct ksmbd_session *sess,
+		      struct ntlmv2_resp *ntlmv2, int blen, char *domain_name,
+		      char *cryptkey, char *sess_key);
+int ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob(struct authenticate_message *authblob,
+				   int blob_len, struct ksmbd_conn *conn,
+				   struct ksmbd_session *sess, char *sess_key);
+int ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_neg_blob(struct negotiate_message *negblob,
+				  int blob_len, struct ksmbd_conn *conn);
+unsigned int
+ksmbd_build_ntlmssp_challenge_blob(struct challenge_message *chgblob,
+				   struct ksmbd_conn *conn);
+int ksmbd_krb5_authenticate(struct ksmbd_session *sess, char *in_blob,
+			    int in_len, char *out_blob, int *out_len,
+			    char *sess_key);
+void ksmbd_sign_smb2_pdu(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, char *key, struct kvec *iov,
+			 int n_vec, char *sig);
+void ksmbd_sign_smb3_pdu(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, char *key, struct kvec *iov,
+			 int n_vec, char *sig);
+int ksmbd_gen_smb30_signingkey(struct ksmbd_session *sess,
+			       struct ksmbd_conn *conn);
+int ksmbd_gen_smb311_signingkey(struct ksmbd_session *sess,
+				struct ksmbd_conn *conn);
+void ksmbd_gen_smb30_encryptionkey(struct ksmbd_conn *conn,
+				   struct ksmbd_session *sess);
+void ksmbd_gen_smb311_encryptionkey(struct ksmbd_conn *conn,
+				    struct ksmbd_session *sess);
+int ksmbd_gen_preauth_integrity_hash(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, char *buf,
+				     __u8 *pi_hash);
+#endif