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| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /fs/smb/server/auth.h | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/smb/server/auth.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/smb/server/auth.h | 70 |
1 files changed, 70 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/smb/server/auth.h b/fs/smb/server/auth.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f14b7c033 --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/smb/server/auth.h @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2018 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. + */ + +#ifndef __AUTH_H__ +#define __AUTH_H__ + +#include "ntlmssp.h" + +#ifdef CONFIG_SMB_SERVER_KERBEROS5 +#define AUTH_GSS_LENGTH 96 +#define AUTH_GSS_PADDING 0 +#else +#define AUTH_GSS_LENGTH 74 +#define AUTH_GSS_PADDING 6 +#endif + +#define CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE (16) +#define CIFS_NTHASH_SIZE (16) + +/* + * Size of the ntlm client response + */ +#define CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE 24 +#define CIFS_SMB1_SIGNATURE_SIZE 8 +#define CIFS_SMB1_SESSKEY_SIZE 16 + +#define KSMBD_AUTH_NTLMSSP 0x0001 +#define KSMBD_AUTH_KRB5 0x0002 +#define KSMBD_AUTH_MSKRB5 0x0004 +#define KSMBD_AUTH_KRB5U2U 0x0008 + +struct ksmbd_session; +struct ksmbd_conn; +struct ksmbd_work; +struct kvec; + +int ksmbd_crypt_message(struct ksmbd_work *work, struct kvec *iov, + unsigned int nvec, int enc); +void ksmbd_copy_gss_neg_header(void *buf); +int ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, struct ksmbd_session *sess, + struct ntlmv2_resp *ntlmv2, int blen, char *domain_name, + char *cryptkey, char *sess_key); +int ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob(struct authenticate_message *authblob, + int blob_len, struct ksmbd_conn *conn, + struct ksmbd_session *sess, char *sess_key); +int ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_neg_blob(struct negotiate_message *negblob, + int blob_len, struct ksmbd_conn *conn); +unsigned int +ksmbd_build_ntlmssp_challenge_blob(struct challenge_message *chgblob, + struct ksmbd_conn *conn); +int ksmbd_krb5_authenticate(struct ksmbd_session *sess, char *in_blob, + int in_len, char *out_blob, int *out_len, + char *sess_key); +void ksmbd_sign_smb2_pdu(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, char *key, struct kvec *iov, + int n_vec, char *sig); +void ksmbd_sign_smb3_pdu(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, char *key, struct kvec *iov, + int n_vec, char *sig); +int ksmbd_gen_smb30_signingkey(struct ksmbd_session *sess, + struct ksmbd_conn *conn); +int ksmbd_gen_smb311_signingkey(struct ksmbd_session *sess, + struct ksmbd_conn *conn); +void ksmbd_gen_smb30_encryptionkey(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, + struct ksmbd_session *sess); +void ksmbd_gen_smb311_encryptionkey(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, + struct ksmbd_session *sess); +int ksmbd_gen_preauth_integrity_hash(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, char *buf, + __u8 *pi_hash); +#endif |
