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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /fs/resctrl/Kconfig
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staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/resctrl/Kconfig')
-rw-r--r--fs/resctrl/Kconfig39
1 files changed, 39 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/resctrl/Kconfig b/fs/resctrl/Kconfig
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+config RESCTRL_FS
+ bool "CPU Resource Control Filesystem (resctrl)"
+ depends on ARCH_HAS_CPU_RESCTRL
+ select KERNFS
+ select PROC_CPU_RESCTRL if PROC_FS
+ help
+ Some architectures provide hardware facilities to group tasks and
+ monitor and control their usage of memory system resources such as
+ caches and memory bandwidth. Examples of such facilities include
+ Intel's Resource Director Technology (Intel(R) RDT) and AMD's
+ Platform Quality of Service (AMD QoS).
+
+ If your system has the necessary support and you want to be able to
+ assign tasks to groups and manipulate the associated resource
+ monitors and controls from userspace, say Y here to get a mountable
+ 'resctrl' filesystem that lets you do just that.
+
+ If nothing mounts or prods the 'resctrl' filesystem, resource
+ controls and monitors are left in a quiescent, permissive state.
+
+ On architectures where this can be disabled independently, it is
+ safe to say N.
+
+ See <file:Documentation/filesystems/resctrl.rst> for more information.
+
+config RESCTRL_FS_PSEUDO_LOCK
+ bool
+ depends on RESCTRL_FS
+ help
+ Software mechanism to pin data in a cache portion using
+ micro-architecture specific knowledge.
+
+config RESCTRL_RMID_DEPENDS_ON_CLOSID
+ bool
+ depends on RESCTRL_FS
+ help
+ Enabled by the architecture when the RMID values depend on the CLOSID.
+ This causes the CLOSID allocator to search for CLOSID with clean
+ RMID.