openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted

sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.

    l.lwz   r29,0(r4)
    l.lwz   r27,0(r5)
    l.sw    0(r4),r27
    l.sw    0(r5),r29

The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.

A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.

This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.

Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.

[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>

1 files changed, 39 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/fs/resctrl/Kconfig b/fs/resctrl/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..21671301b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/resctrl/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+config RESCTRL_FS
+	bool "CPU Resource Control Filesystem (resctrl)"
+	depends on ARCH_HAS_CPU_RESCTRL
+	select KERNFS
+	select PROC_CPU_RESCTRL if PROC_FS
+	help
+	  Some architectures provide hardware facilities to group tasks and
+	  monitor and control their usage of memory system resources such as
+	  caches and memory bandwidth.  Examples of such facilities include
+	  Intel's Resource Director Technology (Intel(R) RDT) and AMD's
+	  Platform Quality of Service (AMD QoS).
+
+	  If your system has the necessary support and you want to be able to
+	  assign tasks to groups and manipulate the associated resource
+	  monitors and controls from userspace, say Y here to get a mountable
+	  'resctrl' filesystem that lets you do just that.
+
+	  If nothing mounts or prods the 'resctrl' filesystem, resource
+	  controls and monitors are left in a quiescent, permissive state.
+
+	  On architectures where this can be disabled independently, it is
+	  safe to say N.
+
+	  See <file:Documentation/filesystems/resctrl.rst> for more information.
+
+config RESCTRL_FS_PSEUDO_LOCK
+	bool
+	depends on RESCTRL_FS
+	help
+	  Software mechanism to pin data in a cache portion using
+	  micro-architecture specific knowledge.
+
+config RESCTRL_RMID_DEPENDS_ON_CLOSID
+	bool
+	depends on RESCTRL_FS
+	help
+	  Enabled by the architecture when the RMID values depend on the CLOSID.
+	  This causes the CLOSID allocator to search for CLOSID with clean
+	  RMID.