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authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /fs/proc/thread_self.c
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/proc/thread_self.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/proc/thread_self.c65
1 files changed, 65 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/thread_self.c b/fs/proc/thread_self.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..61ac62c3f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/proc/thread_self.c
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/cache.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+
+/*
+ * /proc/thread_self:
+ */
+static const char *proc_thread_self_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct inode *inode,
+ struct delayed_call *done)
+{
+ struct pid_namespace *ns = proc_pid_ns(inode->i_sb);
+ pid_t tgid = task_tgid_nr_ns(current, ns);
+ pid_t pid = task_pid_nr_ns(current, ns);
+ char *name;
+
+ if (!pid)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
+ name = kmalloc(10 + 6 + 10 + 1, dentry ? GFP_KERNEL : GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (unlikely(!name))
+ return dentry ? ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM) : ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
+ sprintf(name, "%u/task/%u", tgid, pid);
+ set_delayed_call(done, kfree_link, name);
+ return name;
+}
+
+static const struct inode_operations proc_thread_self_inode_operations = {
+ .get_link = proc_thread_self_get_link,
+};
+
+unsigned thread_self_inum __ro_after_init;
+
+int proc_setup_thread_self(struct super_block *s)
+{
+ struct dentry *thread_self;
+ int ret = -ENOMEM;
+
+ thread_self = d_alloc_name(s->s_root, "thread-self");
+ if (thread_self) {
+ struct inode *inode = new_inode(s);
+ if (inode) {
+ inode->i_ino = thread_self_inum;
+ simple_inode_init_ts(inode);
+ inode->i_mode = S_IFLNK | S_IRWXUGO;
+ inode->i_uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
+ inode->i_gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID;
+ inode->i_op = &proc_thread_self_inode_operations;
+ d_make_persistent(thread_self, inode);
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ dput(thread_self);
+ }
+
+ if (ret)
+ pr_err("proc_fill_super: can't allocate /proc/thread-self\n");
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void __init proc_thread_self_init(void)
+{
+ proc_alloc_inum(&thread_self_inum);
+}