staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 63 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/fs/proc/kmsg.c b/fs/proc/kmsg.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2fc92a13f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/proc/kmsg.c
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ *  linux/fs/proc/kmsg.c
+ *
+ *  Copyright (C) 1992  by Linus Torvalds
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/time.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/poll.h>
+#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/syslog.h>
+
+#include <asm/io.h>
+
+static int kmsg_open(struct inode * inode, struct file * file)
+{
+	return do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_PROC);
+}
+
+static int kmsg_release(struct inode * inode, struct file * file)
+{
+	(void) do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_PROC);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static ssize_t kmsg_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+			 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	if ((file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) &&
+	    !do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_UNREAD, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_PROC))
+		return -EAGAIN;
+	return do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_READ, buf, count, SYSLOG_FROM_PROC);
+}
+
+static __poll_t kmsg_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
+{
+	poll_wait(file, &log_wait, wait);
+	if (do_syslog(SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_UNREAD, NULL, 0, SYSLOG_FROM_PROC))
+		return EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+static const struct proc_ops kmsg_proc_ops = {
+	.proc_flags	= PROC_ENTRY_PERMANENT,
+	.proc_read	= kmsg_read,
+	.proc_poll	= kmsg_poll,
+	.proc_open	= kmsg_open,
+	.proc_release	= kmsg_release,
+	.proc_lseek	= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+static int __init proc_kmsg_init(void)
+{
+	proc_create("kmsg", S_IRUSR, NULL, &kmsg_proc_ops);
+	return 0;
+}
+fs_initcall(proc_kmsg_init);