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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /fs/proc/devices.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/proc/devices.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/devices.c | 64 |
1 files changed, 64 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/devices.c b/fs/proc/devices.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fe7bfcb7d --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/proc/devices.c @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/proc_fs.h> +#include <linux/seq_file.h> +#include <linux/blkdev.h> +#include "internal.h" + +static int devinfo_show(struct seq_file *f, void *v) +{ + int i = *(loff_t *) v; + + if (i < CHRDEV_MAJOR_MAX) { + if (i == 0) + seq_puts(f, "Character devices:\n"); + chrdev_show(f, i); + } +#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK + else { + i -= CHRDEV_MAJOR_MAX; + if (i == 0) + seq_puts(f, "\nBlock devices:\n"); + blkdev_show(f, i); + } +#endif + return 0; +} + +static void *devinfo_start(struct seq_file *f, loff_t *pos) +{ + if (*pos < (BLKDEV_MAJOR_MAX + CHRDEV_MAJOR_MAX)) + return pos; + return NULL; +} + +static void *devinfo_next(struct seq_file *f, void *v, loff_t *pos) +{ + (*pos)++; + if (*pos >= (BLKDEV_MAJOR_MAX + CHRDEV_MAJOR_MAX)) + return NULL; + return pos; +} + +static void devinfo_stop(struct seq_file *f, void *v) +{ + /* Nothing to do */ +} + +static const struct seq_operations devinfo_ops = { + .start = devinfo_start, + .next = devinfo_next, + .stop = devinfo_stop, + .show = devinfo_show +}; + +static int __init proc_devices_init(void) +{ + struct proc_dir_entry *pde; + + pde = proc_create_seq("devices", 0, NULL, &devinfo_ops); + pde_make_permanent(pde); + return 0; +} +fs_initcall(proc_devices_init); |
