diff options
| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /fs/pnode.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/pnode.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/pnode.h | 65 |
1 files changed, 65 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/pnode.h b/fs/pnode.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b029db225 --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/pnode.h @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * linux/fs/pnode.h + * + * (C) Copyright IBM Corporation 2005. + */ +#ifndef _LINUX_PNODE_H +#define _LINUX_PNODE_H + +#include <linux/list.h> +#include "mount.h" + +#define IS_MNT_SHARED(m) ((m)->mnt_t_flags & T_SHARED) +#define IS_MNT_SLAVE(m) ((m)->mnt_master) +#define IS_MNT_NEW(m) (!(m)->mnt_ns) +#define CLEAR_MNT_SHARED(m) ((m)->mnt_t_flags &= ~T_SHARED) +#define IS_MNT_UNBINDABLE(m) ((m)->mnt_t_flags & T_UNBINDABLE) +#define IS_MNT_MARKED(m) ((m)->mnt_t_flags & T_MARKED) +#define SET_MNT_MARK(m) ((m)->mnt_t_flags |= T_MARKED) +#define CLEAR_MNT_MARK(m) ((m)->mnt_t_flags &= ~T_MARKED) +#define IS_MNT_LOCKED(m) ((m)->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED) + +#define CL_EXPIRE 0x01 +#define CL_SLAVE 0x02 +#define CL_COPY_UNBINDABLE 0x04 +#define CL_MAKE_SHARED 0x08 +#define CL_PRIVATE 0x10 +#define CL_COPY_MNT_NS_FILE 0x40 + +/* + * EXCL[namespace_sem] + */ +static inline void set_mnt_shared(struct mount *mnt) +{ + mnt->mnt_t_flags &= ~T_SHARED_MASK; + mnt->mnt_t_flags |= T_SHARED; +} + +static inline bool peers(const struct mount *m1, const struct mount *m2) +{ + return m1->mnt_group_id == m2->mnt_group_id && m1->mnt_group_id; +} + +void change_mnt_propagation(struct mount *, int); +void bulk_make_private(struct list_head *); +int propagate_mnt(struct mount *, struct mountpoint *, struct mount *, + struct hlist_head *); +void propagate_umount(struct list_head *); +int propagate_mount_busy(struct mount *, int); +void propagate_mount_unlock(struct mount *); +void mnt_release_group_id(struct mount *); +int get_dominating_id(struct mount *mnt, const struct path *root); +int mnt_get_count(struct mount *mnt); +void mnt_set_mountpoint(struct mount *, struct mountpoint *, + struct mount *); +void mnt_change_mountpoint(struct mount *parent, struct mountpoint *mp, + struct mount *mnt); +struct mount *copy_tree(struct mount *, struct dentry *, int); +bool is_path_reachable(struct mount *, struct dentry *, + const struct path *root); +int count_mounts(struct mnt_namespace *ns, struct mount *mnt); +bool propagation_would_overmount(const struct mount *from, + const struct mount *to, + const struct mountpoint *mp); +#endif /* _LINUX_PNODE_H */ |
