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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /fs/overlayfs/params.h
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staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/overlayfs/params.h')
-rw-r--r--fs/overlayfs/params.h44
1 files changed, 44 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/params.h b/fs/overlayfs/params.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ffd53cdd8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/params.h
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+
+#include <linux/fs_context.h>
+#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
+
+struct ovl_fs;
+struct ovl_config;
+
+extern const struct fs_parameter_spec ovl_parameter_spec[];
+extern const struct constant_table ovl_parameter_redirect_dir[];
+
+/* The set of options that user requested explicitly via mount options */
+struct ovl_opt_set {
+ bool metacopy;
+ bool redirect;
+ bool nfs_export;
+ bool index;
+};
+
+#define OVL_MAX_STACK 500
+
+struct ovl_fs_context_layer {
+ char *name;
+ struct path path;
+};
+
+struct ovl_fs_context {
+ struct path upper;
+ struct path work;
+ size_t capacity;
+ size_t nr; /* includes nr_data */
+ size_t nr_data;
+ struct ovl_opt_set set;
+ struct ovl_fs_context_layer *lower;
+ char *lowerdir_all; /* user provided lowerdir string */
+ bool casefold_set;
+};
+
+int ovl_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc);
+void ovl_free_fs(struct ovl_fs *ofs);
+int ovl_fs_params_verify(const struct ovl_fs_context *ctx,
+ struct ovl_config *config);
+int ovl_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *dentry);
+const char *ovl_xino_mode(struct ovl_config *config);