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authorJinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com>2026-09-08 15:37:42 +0800
committerIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>2026-09-17 09:48:42 +0200
commita5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255 (patch)
tree73fef824f9a846cf935869d0dbc5070ef6e2f741 /fs/orangefs/dcache.c
downloadlinux-stable-a5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255.tar.gz
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x86/kprobes: Fix crash when probing CS CALL instructionsgrafted
When using eBPF to probe CS CALL instructions within a function, a crash can be triggered. The eBPF tool probes offset 257 of the __hrtimer_run_queues() function: <__hrtimer_run_queues+249>: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1) <__hrtimer_run_queues+254>: mov %r14,%rdi <__hrtimer_run_queues+257>: cs call <__x86_indirect_thunk_r12> <__hrtimer_run_queues+263>: mov %eax,%r12d <__hrtimer_run_queues+266>: xchg %ax,%ax <__hrtimer_run_queues+268>: mov %r13,%rdi Which triggers this crash: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000000f41c9 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: P RIP: 0010:__hrtimer_run_queues+0x106/0x230 Note that __hrtimer_run_queues+0x106 is __hrtimer_run_queues+262, which is at the 6th byte of the above CS CALL instruction. Since the CS CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes, the exception occurred in the middle of that call instruction. The root cause is that when using eBPF tools to probe in the middle of a function, a kprobe with INT3 is used as the underlying implementation. During single-step emulation of the original CALL instruction, int3_emulate_call() assumes that the probed CALL instruction is 5 bytes long. However, the actual CS-prefixed CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes, so it constructs an incorrect exception return address. When the CPU returns from the kprobe handler, the next instruction to be executed is at the address of the last byte of that CS CALL instruction. Coincidentally, starting from that address, the CPU fetches and decodes a completely different instruction, which ultimately triggers a kernel crash. Fix the issue by using the actual instruction length obtained from the instruction decoder when constructing the exception return address, rather than relying on the hardcoded CALL_INSN_SIZE macro. [ mingo: Refined the changelog ] Fixes: 6256e668b7af ("x86/kprobes: Use int3 instead of debug trap for single-step") Suggested-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260908073742.GA10517@didi-ThinkCentre-M920t-N000
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/orangefs/dcache.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/orangefs/dcache.c139
1 files changed, 139 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/orangefs/dcache.c b/fs/orangefs/dcache.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a19d1ad70
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/orangefs/dcache.c
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * (C) 2001 Clemson University and The University of Chicago
+ *
+ * See COPYING in top-level directory.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Implementation of dentry (directory cache) functions.
+ */
+
+#include "protocol.h"
+#include "orangefs-kernel.h"
+
+/* Returns 1 if dentry can still be trusted, else 0. */
+static int orangefs_revalidate_lookup(struct inode *parent_inode, const struct qstr *name,
+ struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ struct orangefs_inode_s *parent = ORANGEFS_I(parent_inode);
+ struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+ struct orangefs_kernel_op_s *new_op;
+ int ret = 0;
+ int err = 0;
+
+ gossip_debug(GOSSIP_DCACHE_DEBUG, "%s: attempting lookup.\n", __func__);
+
+ new_op = op_alloc(ORANGEFS_VFS_OP_LOOKUP);
+ if (!new_op)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ new_op->upcall.req.lookup.sym_follow = ORANGEFS_LOOKUP_LINK_NO_FOLLOW;
+ new_op->upcall.req.lookup.parent_refn = parent->refn;
+ /* op_alloc() leaves ->upcall zeroed */
+ memcpy(new_op->upcall.req.lookup.d_name, name->name,
+ min(name->len, ORANGEFS_NAME_MAX - 1));
+
+ gossip_debug(GOSSIP_DCACHE_DEBUG,
+ "%s:%s:%d interrupt flag [%d]\n",
+ __FILE__,
+ __func__,
+ __LINE__,
+ get_interruptible_flag(parent_inode));
+
+ err = service_operation(new_op, "orangefs_lookup",
+ get_interruptible_flag(parent_inode));
+
+ /* Positive dentry: reject if error or not the same inode. */
+ if (inode) {
+ if (err) {
+ gossip_debug(GOSSIP_DCACHE_DEBUG,
+ "%s:%s:%d lookup failure.\n",
+ __FILE__, __func__, __LINE__);
+ goto out_drop;
+ }
+ if (!match_handle(new_op->downcall.resp.lookup.refn.khandle,
+ inode)) {
+ gossip_debug(GOSSIP_DCACHE_DEBUG,
+ "%s:%s:%d no match.\n",
+ __FILE__, __func__, __LINE__);
+ goto out_drop;
+ }
+
+ /* Negative dentry: reject if success or error other than ENOENT. */
+ } else {
+ gossip_debug(GOSSIP_DCACHE_DEBUG, "%s: negative dentry.\n",
+ __func__);
+ if (!err || err != -ENOENT) {
+ if (new_op->downcall.status != 0)
+ gossip_debug(GOSSIP_DCACHE_DEBUG,
+ "%s:%s:%d lookup failure.\n",
+ __FILE__, __func__, __LINE__);
+ goto out_drop;
+ }
+ }
+
+ orangefs_set_timeout(dentry);
+ ret = 1;
+out_release_op:
+ op_release(new_op);
+ return ret;
+out_drop:
+ gossip_debug(GOSSIP_DCACHE_DEBUG, "%s:%s:%d revalidate failed\n",
+ __FILE__, __func__, __LINE__);
+ goto out_release_op;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that dentry is valid.
+ *
+ * Should return 1 if dentry can still be trusted, else 0.
+ */
+static int orangefs_d_revalidate(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *name,
+ struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ int ret;
+ unsigned long time = (unsigned long) dentry->d_fsdata;
+
+ if (time_before(jiffies, time))
+ return 1;
+
+ if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
+ return -ECHILD;
+
+ gossip_debug(GOSSIP_DCACHE_DEBUG, "%s: called on dentry %p.\n",
+ __func__, dentry);
+
+ /* skip root handle lookups. */
+ if (dentry->d_inode && is_root_handle(dentry->d_inode))
+ return 1;
+
+ /*
+ * If this passes, the positive dentry still exists or the negative
+ * dentry still does not exist.
+ */
+ if (!orangefs_revalidate_lookup(dir, name, dentry))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* We do not need to continue with negative dentries. */
+ if (!dentry->d_inode) {
+ gossip_debug(GOSSIP_DCACHE_DEBUG,
+ "%s: negative dentry or positive dentry and inode valid.\n",
+ __func__);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Now we must perform a getattr to validate the inode contents. */
+
+ ret = orangefs_inode_check_changed(dentry->d_inode);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ gossip_debug(GOSSIP_DCACHE_DEBUG, "%s:%s:%d getattr failure.\n",
+ __FILE__, __func__, __LINE__);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return !ret;
+}
+
+const struct dentry_operations orangefs_dentry_operations = {
+ .d_revalidate = orangefs_d_revalidate,
+};