openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted

sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.

    l.lwz   r29,0(r4)
    l.lwz   r27,0(r5)
    l.sw    0(r4),r27
    l.sw    0(r5),r29

The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.

A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.

This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.

Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.

[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>

1 files changed, 153 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/fs/orangefs/acl.c b/fs/orangefs/acl.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a01ef0c1b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/orangefs/acl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * (C) 2001 Clemson University and The University of Chicago
+ *
+ * See COPYING in top-level directory.
+ */
+
+#include "protocol.h"
+#include "orangefs-kernel.h"
+#include "orangefs-bufmap.h"
+#include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h>
+
+struct posix_acl *orangefs_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type, bool rcu)
+{
+	struct posix_acl *acl;
+	int ret;
+	char *key = NULL, *value = NULL;
+
+	if (rcu)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
+		key = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
+		break;
+	case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
+		key = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
+		break;
+	default:
+		gossip_err("orangefs_get_acl: bogus value of type %d\n", type);
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Rather than incurring a network call just to determine the exact
+	 * length of the attribute, I just allocate a max length to save on
+	 * the network call. Conceivably, we could pass NULL to
+	 * orangefs_inode_getxattr() to probe the length of the value, but
+	 * I don't do that for now.
+	 */
+	value = kmalloc(ORANGEFS_MAX_XATTR_VALUELEN, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!value)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	gossip_debug(GOSSIP_ACL_DEBUG,
+		     "inode %pU, key %s, type %d\n",
+		     get_khandle_from_ino(inode),
+		     key,
+		     type);
+	ret = orangefs_inode_getxattr(inode, key, value,
+				      ORANGEFS_MAX_XATTR_VALUELEN);
+	/* if the key exists, convert it to an in-memory rep */
+	if (ret > 0) {
+		acl = posix_acl_from_xattr(&init_user_ns, value, ret);
+	} else if (ret == -ENODATA || ret == -ENOSYS) {
+		acl = NULL;
+	} else {
+		gossip_err("inode %pU retrieving acl's failed with error %d\n",
+			   get_khandle_from_ino(inode),
+			   ret);
+		acl = ERR_PTR(ret);
+	}
+	/* kfree(NULL) is safe, so don't worry if value ever got used */
+	kfree(value);
+	return acl;
+}
+
+int __orangefs_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
+{
+	int error = 0;
+	void *value = NULL;
+	size_t size = 0;
+	const char *name = NULL;
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
+		name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
+		break;
+	case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
+		name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
+		break;
+	default:
+		gossip_err("%s: invalid type %d!\n", __func__, type);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	gossip_debug(GOSSIP_ACL_DEBUG,
+		     "%s: inode %pU, key %s type %d\n",
+		     __func__, get_khandle_from_ino(inode),
+		     name,
+		     type);
+
+	if (acl) {
+		value = posix_acl_to_xattr(&init_user_ns, acl, &size, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!value)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	gossip_debug(GOSSIP_ACL_DEBUG,
+		     "%s: name %s, value %p, size %zd, acl %p\n",
+		     __func__, name, value, size, acl);
+	/*
+	 * Go ahead and set the extended attribute now. NOTE: Suppose acl
+	 * was NULL, then value will be NULL and size will be 0 and that
+	 * will xlate to a removexattr. However, we don't want removexattr
+	 * complain if attributes does not exist.
+	 */
+	error = orangefs_inode_setxattr(inode, name, value, size, 0);
+
+	kfree(value);
+	if (!error)
+		set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
+	return error;
+}
+
+int orangefs_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
+		     struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
+{
+	int error;
+	struct iattr iattr;
+	int rc;
+	struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
+
+	memset(&iattr, 0, sizeof iattr);
+
+	if (type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS && acl) {
+		/*
+		 * posix_acl_update_mode checks to see if the permissions
+		 * described by the ACL can be encoded into the
+		 * object's mode. If so, it sets "acl" to NULL
+		 * and "mode" to the new desired value. It is up to
+		 * us to propagate the new mode back to the server...
+		 */
+		error = posix_acl_update_mode(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode,
+					      &iattr.ia_mode, &acl);
+		if (error) {
+			gossip_err("%s: posix_acl_update_mode err: %d\n",
+				   __func__,
+				   error);
+			return error;
+		}
+
+		if (inode->i_mode != iattr.ia_mode)
+			iattr.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE;
+
+	}
+
+	rc = __orangefs_set_acl(inode, acl, type);
+
+	if (!rc && (iattr.ia_valid == ATTR_MODE))
+		rc = __orangefs_setattr_mode(dentry, &iattr);
+
+	return rc;
+}