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| author | Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> | 2026-09-02 09:55:01 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> | 2026-09-02 11:08:21 -0400 |
| commit | 4617721c502b2ddaa4e324e86da4997edf738fa5 (patch) | |
| tree | 350aa83b47da0b574a814795392b20b0bed83cbc /fs/orangefs/acl.c | |
| download | linux-stable-4617721c502b2ddaa4e324e86da4997edf738fa5.tar.gz linux-stable-4617721c502b2ddaa4e324e86da4997edf738fa5.zip | |
ftrace: Synchronize the initialization of ftrace_opsgrafted
There's some internal state that ftrace_ops needs to have set, but since
it can be declared outside of the ftrace.c code, it calls
ftrace_ops_init() on the ops in every global function. The issue is that
if two tasks call it on the same ops at the same time it is possible to
have the initialization of one corrupt the initialization of the other
call.
Create a ops_mutex to use to synchronize every initialization of the
ftrace_ops. The mutex is taken within checking the ftrace_ops flag that
states it was initializied but the flag is checked again after the mutex
has been taken. Checking first outside the mutex allows it to shortcut
having to take the mutex. But then the check needs to be done again after
the mute is taken in case of races.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260902095501.6b59af20@gandalf.local.home
Fixes: f04f24fb7e48d ("ftrace, kprobes: Fix a deadlock on ftrace_regex_lock")
Reported-by: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Close: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260829025528.49A831F000E9@smtp.kernel.org/
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/orangefs/acl.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/orangefs/acl.c | 153 |
1 files changed, 153 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/orangefs/acl.c b/fs/orangefs/acl.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a01ef0c1b --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/orangefs/acl.c @@ -0,0 +1,153 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * (C) 2001 Clemson University and The University of Chicago + * + * See COPYING in top-level directory. + */ + +#include "protocol.h" +#include "orangefs-kernel.h" +#include "orangefs-bufmap.h" +#include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h> + +struct posix_acl *orangefs_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type, bool rcu) +{ + struct posix_acl *acl; + int ret; + char *key = NULL, *value = NULL; + + if (rcu) + return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD); + + switch (type) { + case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS: + key = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS; + break; + case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT: + key = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT; + break; + default: + gossip_err("orangefs_get_acl: bogus value of type %d\n", type); + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + } + /* + * Rather than incurring a network call just to determine the exact + * length of the attribute, I just allocate a max length to save on + * the network call. Conceivably, we could pass NULL to + * orangefs_inode_getxattr() to probe the length of the value, but + * I don't do that for now. + */ + value = kmalloc(ORANGEFS_MAX_XATTR_VALUELEN, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!value) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + gossip_debug(GOSSIP_ACL_DEBUG, + "inode %pU, key %s, type %d\n", + get_khandle_from_ino(inode), + key, + type); + ret = orangefs_inode_getxattr(inode, key, value, + ORANGEFS_MAX_XATTR_VALUELEN); + /* if the key exists, convert it to an in-memory rep */ + if (ret > 0) { + acl = posix_acl_from_xattr(&init_user_ns, value, ret); + } else if (ret == -ENODATA || ret == -ENOSYS) { + acl = NULL; + } else { + gossip_err("inode %pU retrieving acl's failed with error %d\n", + get_khandle_from_ino(inode), + ret); + acl = ERR_PTR(ret); + } + /* kfree(NULL) is safe, so don't worry if value ever got used */ + kfree(value); + return acl; +} + +int __orangefs_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type) +{ + int error = 0; + void *value = NULL; + size_t size = 0; + const char *name = NULL; + + switch (type) { + case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS: + name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS; + break; + case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT: + name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT; + break; + default: + gossip_err("%s: invalid type %d!\n", __func__, type); + return -EINVAL; + } + + gossip_debug(GOSSIP_ACL_DEBUG, + "%s: inode %pU, key %s type %d\n", + __func__, get_khandle_from_ino(inode), + name, + type); + + if (acl) { + value = posix_acl_to_xattr(&init_user_ns, acl, &size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!value) + return -ENOMEM; + } + + gossip_debug(GOSSIP_ACL_DEBUG, + "%s: name %s, value %p, size %zd, acl %p\n", + __func__, name, value, size, acl); + /* + * Go ahead and set the extended attribute now. NOTE: Suppose acl + * was NULL, then value will be NULL and size will be 0 and that + * will xlate to a removexattr. However, we don't want removexattr + * complain if attributes does not exist. + */ + error = orangefs_inode_setxattr(inode, name, value, size, 0); + + kfree(value); + if (!error) + set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl); + return error; +} + +int orangefs_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + struct posix_acl *acl, int type) +{ + int error; + struct iattr iattr; + int rc; + struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); + + memset(&iattr, 0, sizeof iattr); + + if (type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS && acl) { + /* + * posix_acl_update_mode checks to see if the permissions + * described by the ACL can be encoded into the + * object's mode. If so, it sets "acl" to NULL + * and "mode" to the new desired value. It is up to + * us to propagate the new mode back to the server... + */ + error = posix_acl_update_mode(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode, + &iattr.ia_mode, &acl); + if (error) { + gossip_err("%s: posix_acl_update_mode err: %d\n", + __func__, + error); + return error; + } + + if (inode->i_mode != iattr.ia_mode) + iattr.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE; + + } + + rc = __orangefs_set_acl(inode, acl, type); + + if (!rc && (iattr.ia_valid == ATTR_MODE)) + rc = __orangefs_setattr_mode(dentry, &iattr); + + return rc; +} |
