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| author | Jinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com> | 2026-09-08 15:37:42 +0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> | 2026-09-17 09:48:42 +0200 |
| commit | a5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255 (patch) | |
| tree | 73fef824f9a846cf935869d0dbc5070ef6e2f741 /fs/ocfs2/extent_map.h | |
| download | linux-stable-a5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255.tar.gz linux-stable-a5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255.zip | |
x86/kprobes: Fix crash when probing CS CALL instructionsgrafted
When using eBPF to probe CS CALL instructions within a function,
a crash can be triggered.
The eBPF tool probes offset 257 of the __hrtimer_run_queues()
function:
<__hrtimer_run_queues+249>: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
<__hrtimer_run_queues+254>: mov %r14,%rdi
<__hrtimer_run_queues+257>: cs call <__x86_indirect_thunk_r12>
<__hrtimer_run_queues+263>: mov %eax,%r12d
<__hrtimer_run_queues+266>: xchg %ax,%ax
<__hrtimer_run_queues+268>: mov %r13,%rdi
Which triggers this crash:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000000f41c9
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: P
RIP: 0010:__hrtimer_run_queues+0x106/0x230
Note that __hrtimer_run_queues+0x106 is __hrtimer_run_queues+262, which is
at the 6th byte of the above CS CALL instruction. Since the CS CALL
instruction occupies 6 bytes, the exception occurred in the middle of that
call instruction.
The root cause is that when using eBPF tools to probe in the middle of a
function, a kprobe with INT3 is used as the underlying implementation.
During single-step emulation of the original CALL instruction,
int3_emulate_call() assumes that the probed CALL instruction is 5 bytes
long. However, the actual CS-prefixed CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes,
so it constructs an incorrect exception return address. When the CPU
returns from the kprobe handler, the next instruction to be executed is at
the address of the last byte of that CS CALL instruction. Coincidentally,
starting from that address, the CPU fetches and decodes a completely
different instruction, which ultimately triggers a kernel crash.
Fix the issue by using the actual instruction length obtained from
the instruction decoder when constructing the exception return
address, rather than relying on the hardcoded CALL_INSN_SIZE macro.
[ mingo: Refined the changelog ]
Fixes: 6256e668b7af ("x86/kprobes: Use int3 instead of debug trap for single-step")
Suggested-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260908073742.GA10517@didi-ThinkCentre-M920t-N000
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/ocfs2/extent_map.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/ocfs2/extent_map.h | 80 |
1 files changed, 80 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/extent_map.h b/fs/ocfs2/extent_map.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..bc4ed59fb --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/ocfs2/extent_map.h @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * extent_map.h + * + * In-memory file extent mappings for OCFS2. + * + * Copyright (C) 2004 Oracle. All rights reserved. + */ + +#ifndef _EXTENT_MAP_H +#define _EXTENT_MAP_H + +struct ocfs2_extent_map_item { + unsigned int ei_cpos; + unsigned int ei_phys; + unsigned int ei_clusters; + unsigned int ei_flags; + + struct list_head ei_list; +}; + +#define OCFS2_MAX_EXTENT_MAP_ITEMS 3 +struct ocfs2_extent_map { + unsigned int em_num_items; + struct list_head em_list; +}; + +void ocfs2_extent_map_init(struct inode *inode); +void ocfs2_extent_map_trunc(struct inode *inode, unsigned int cluster); +void ocfs2_extent_map_insert_rec(struct inode *inode, + struct ocfs2_extent_rec *rec); + +int ocfs2_get_clusters(struct inode *inode, u32 v_cluster, u32 *p_cluster, + u32 *num_clusters, unsigned int *extent_flags); +int ocfs2_extent_map_get_blocks(struct inode *inode, u64 v_blkno, u64 *p_blkno, + u64 *ret_count, unsigned int *extent_flags); + +int ocfs2_fiemap(struct inode *inode, struct fiemap_extent_info *fieinfo, + u64 map_start, u64 map_len); + +int ocfs2_overwrite_io(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head *di_bh, + u64 map_start, u64 map_len); + +int ocfs2_seek_data_hole_offset(struct file *file, loff_t *offset, int origin); + +int ocfs2_xattr_get_clusters(struct inode *inode, u32 v_cluster, + u32 *p_cluster, u32 *num_clusters, + struct ocfs2_extent_list *el, + unsigned int *extent_flags); + +int ocfs2_read_virt_blocks(struct inode *inode, u64 v_block, int nr, + struct buffer_head *bhs[], int flags, + int (*validate)(struct super_block *sb, + struct buffer_head *bh)); +int ocfs2_figure_hole_clusters(struct ocfs2_caching_info *ci, + struct ocfs2_extent_list *el, + struct buffer_head *eb_bh, + u32 v_cluster, + u32 *num_clusters); +static inline int ocfs2_read_virt_block(struct inode *inode, u64 v_block, + struct buffer_head **bh, + int (*validate)(struct super_block *sb, + struct buffer_head *bh)) +{ + int status = 0; + + if (bh == NULL) { + printk("ocfs2: bh == NULL\n"); + status = -EINVAL; + goto bail; + } + + status = ocfs2_read_virt_blocks(inode, v_block, 1, bh, 0, validate); + +bail: + return status; +} + + +#endif /* _EXTENT_MAP_H */ |
