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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /fs/nfsd/cache.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/nfsd/cache.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/nfsd/cache.h | 92 |
1 files changed, 92 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/cache.h b/fs/nfsd/cache.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3bc4856e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/nfsd/cache.h @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Request reply cache. This was heavily inspired by the + * implementation in 4.3BSD/4.4BSD. + * + * Copyright (C) 1995, 1996 Olaf Kirch <okir@monad.swb.de> + */ + +#ifndef NFSCACHE_H +#define NFSCACHE_H + +#include <linux/sunrpc/svc.h> + +struct nfsd_net; + +/* + * Representation of a reply cache entry. + * + * Note that we use a sockaddr_in6 to hold the address instead of the more + * typical sockaddr_storage. This is for space reasons, since sockaddr_storage + * is much larger than a sockaddr_in6. + */ +struct nfsd_cacherep { + struct { + /* Keep often-read xid, csum in the same cache line: */ + __be32 k_xid; + __wsum k_csum; + u32 k_proc; + u32 k_prot; + u32 k_vers; + unsigned int k_len; + struct sockaddr_in6 k_addr; + } c_key; + + struct rb_node c_node; + struct list_head c_lru; + unsigned char c_state, /* unused, inprog, done */ + c_type, /* status, buffer */ + c_secure : 1; /* req came from port < 1024 */ + unsigned long c_timestamp; + union { + struct kvec u_vec; + __be32 u_status; + } c_u; +}; + +#define c_replvec c_u.u_vec +#define c_replstat c_u.u_status + +/* cache entry states */ +enum { + RC_UNUSED, + RC_INPROG, + RC_DONE +}; + +/* return values */ +enum { + RC_DROPIT, + RC_REPLY, + RC_DOIT +}; + +/* + * Cache types. + * We may want to add more types one day, e.g. for diropres and + * attrstat replies. Using cache entries with fixed length instead + * of buffer pointers may be more efficient. + */ +enum { + RC_NOCACHE, + RC_REPLSTAT, + RC_REPLBUFF, +}; + +/* Cache entries expire after this time period */ +#define RC_EXPIRE (120 * HZ) + +/* Checksum this amount of the request */ +#define RC_CSUMLEN (256U) + +int nfsd_drc_slab_create(void); +void nfsd_drc_slab_free(void); +int nfsd_reply_cache_init(struct nfsd_net *); +void nfsd_reply_cache_shutdown(struct nfsd_net *); +int nfsd_cache_lookup(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, unsigned int start, + unsigned int len, struct nfsd_cacherep **cacherep); +void nfsd_cache_update(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd_cacherep *rp, + int cachetype, __be32 *statp); +int nfsd_reply_cache_stats_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v); + +#endif /* NFSCACHE_H */ |
