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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /fs/nfsd/auth.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/nfsd/auth.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/nfsd/auth.c108
1 files changed, 108 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/auth.c b/fs/nfsd/auth.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5ef9a0466
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/nfsd/auth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (C) 1995, 1996 Olaf Kirch <okir@monad.swb.de> */
+
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include "nfsd.h"
+#include "export.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+
+int nfsexp_flags(struct svc_cred *cred, struct svc_export *exp)
+{
+ struct exp_flavor_info *f;
+ struct exp_flavor_info *end = exp->ex_flavors + exp->ex_nflavors;
+
+ for (f = exp->ex_flavors; f < end; f++) {
+ if (f->pseudoflavor == cred->cr_flavor)
+ return f->flags;
+ }
+ return exp->ex_flags;
+
+}
+
+int nfsd_setuser(struct svc_cred *cred, struct svc_export *exp)
+{
+ struct group_info *rqgi;
+ struct group_info *gi;
+ struct cred *new;
+ int i;
+ int flags = nfsexp_flags(cred, exp);
+
+ /* discard any old override before preparing the new set */
+ put_cred(revert_creds(get_cred(current_real_cred())));
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ new->fsuid = cred->cr_uid;
+ new->fsgid = cred->cr_gid;
+
+ rqgi = cred->cr_group_info;
+
+ if (flags & NFSEXP_ALLSQUASH) {
+ new->fsuid = exp->ex_anon_uid;
+ new->fsgid = exp->ex_anon_gid;
+ gi = groups_alloc(0);
+ if (!gi)
+ goto oom;
+ } else if (flags & NFSEXP_ROOTSQUASH) {
+ if (uid_eq(new->fsuid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID))
+ new->fsuid = exp->ex_anon_uid;
+ if (gid_eq(new->fsgid, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID))
+ new->fsgid = exp->ex_anon_gid;
+
+ gi = groups_alloc(rqgi->ngroups);
+ if (!gi)
+ goto oom;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < rqgi->ngroups; i++) {
+ if (gid_eq(GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, rqgi->gid[i]))
+ gi->gid[i] = exp->ex_anon_gid;
+ else
+ gi->gid[i] = rqgi->gid[i];
+ }
+
+ /* Each thread allocates its own gi, no race */
+ groups_sort(gi);
+ } else {
+ gi = get_group_info(rqgi);
+ }
+
+ if (uid_eq(new->fsuid, INVALID_UID))
+ new->fsuid = exp->ex_anon_uid;
+ if (gid_eq(new->fsgid, INVALID_GID))
+ new->fsgid = exp->ex_anon_gid;
+
+ set_groups(new, gi);
+ put_group_info(gi);
+
+ if (!uid_eq(new->fsuid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID))
+ new->cap_effective = cap_drop_nfsd_set(new->cap_effective);
+ else
+ new->cap_effective = cap_raise_nfsd_set(new->cap_effective,
+ new->cap_permitted);
+ put_cred(override_creds(new));
+ return 0;
+
+oom:
+ abort_creds(new);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+/**
+ * nfsd_user_namespace - Get user_namespace in effect for an RPC request
+ * @rqstp: RPC execution context
+ *
+ * xpt_cred is set once at transport creation and never modified. The
+ * transport itself is reference-counted during request processing, so
+ * no explicit reference on the namespace is necessary.
+ *
+ * Return: the user_namespace from the transport credential, or
+ * init_user_ns if no credential was set. The returned namespace pointer
+ * is valid for the duration of the RPC request.
+ */
+struct user_namespace *nfsd_user_namespace(const struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
+{
+ const struct cred *cred = rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_cred;
+
+ return cred ? cred->user_ns : &init_user_ns;
+}