x86/kprobes: Fix crash when probing CS CALL instructionsgrafted

When using eBPF to probe CS CALL instructions within a function,
a crash can be triggered.

The eBPF tool probes offset 257 of the __hrtimer_run_queues()
function:

<__hrtimer_run_queues+249>:  nopl   0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
<__hrtimer_run_queues+254>:  mov    %r14,%rdi
<__hrtimer_run_queues+257>:  cs call <__x86_indirect_thunk_r12>
<__hrtimer_run_queues+263>:  mov    %eax,%r12d
<__hrtimer_run_queues+266>:  xchg   %ax,%ax
<__hrtimer_run_queues+268>:  mov    %r13,%rdi

Which triggers this crash:

  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000000f41c9
  #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
  PGD 0 P4D 0
  Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: P
  RIP: 0010:__hrtimer_run_queues+0x106/0x230

Note that __hrtimer_run_queues+0x106 is __hrtimer_run_queues+262, which is
at the 6th byte of the above CS CALL instruction. Since the CS CALL
instruction occupies 6 bytes, the exception occurred in the middle of that
call instruction.

The root cause is that when using eBPF tools to probe in the middle of a
function, a kprobe with INT3 is used as the underlying implementation.

During single-step emulation of the original CALL instruction,
int3_emulate_call() assumes that the probed CALL instruction is 5 bytes
long. However, the actual CS-prefixed CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes,
so it constructs an incorrect exception return address. When the CPU
returns from the kprobe handler, the next instruction to be executed is at
the address of the last byte of that CS CALL instruction. Coincidentally,
starting from that address, the CPU fetches and decodes a completely
different instruction, which ultimately triggers a kernel crash.

Fix the issue by using the actual instruction length obtained from
the instruction decoder when constructing the exception return
address, rather than relying on the hardcoded CALL_INSN_SIZE macro.

[ mingo: Refined the changelog ]

Fixes: 6256e668b7af ("x86/kprobes: Use int3 instead of debug trap for single-step")
Suggested-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260908073742.GA10517@didi-ThinkCentre-M920t-N000

1 files changed, 108 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/fs/nfsd/auth.c b/fs/nfsd/auth.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5ef9a0466
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/nfsd/auth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (C) 1995, 1996 Olaf Kirch <okir@monad.swb.de> */
+
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include "nfsd.h"
+#include "export.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+
+int nfsexp_flags(struct svc_cred *cred, struct svc_export *exp)
+{
+	struct exp_flavor_info *f;
+	struct exp_flavor_info *end = exp->ex_flavors + exp->ex_nflavors;
+
+	for (f = exp->ex_flavors; f < end; f++) {
+		if (f->pseudoflavor == cred->cr_flavor)
+			return f->flags;
+	}
+	return exp->ex_flags;
+
+}
+
+int nfsd_setuser(struct svc_cred *cred, struct svc_export *exp)
+{
+	struct group_info *rqgi;
+	struct group_info *gi;
+	struct cred *new;
+	int i;
+	int flags = nfsexp_flags(cred, exp);
+
+	/* discard any old override before preparing the new set */
+	put_cred(revert_creds(get_cred(current_real_cred())));
+	new = prepare_creds();
+	if (!new)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	new->fsuid = cred->cr_uid;
+	new->fsgid = cred->cr_gid;
+
+	rqgi = cred->cr_group_info;
+
+	if (flags & NFSEXP_ALLSQUASH) {
+		new->fsuid = exp->ex_anon_uid;
+		new->fsgid = exp->ex_anon_gid;
+		gi = groups_alloc(0);
+		if (!gi)
+			goto oom;
+	} else if (flags & NFSEXP_ROOTSQUASH) {
+		if (uid_eq(new->fsuid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID))
+			new->fsuid = exp->ex_anon_uid;
+		if (gid_eq(new->fsgid, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID))
+			new->fsgid = exp->ex_anon_gid;
+
+		gi = groups_alloc(rqgi->ngroups);
+		if (!gi)
+			goto oom;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < rqgi->ngroups; i++) {
+			if (gid_eq(GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, rqgi->gid[i]))
+				gi->gid[i] = exp->ex_anon_gid;
+			else
+				gi->gid[i] = rqgi->gid[i];
+		}
+
+		/* Each thread allocates its own gi, no race */
+		groups_sort(gi);
+	} else {
+		gi = get_group_info(rqgi);
+	}
+
+	if (uid_eq(new->fsuid, INVALID_UID))
+		new->fsuid = exp->ex_anon_uid;
+	if (gid_eq(new->fsgid, INVALID_GID))
+		new->fsgid = exp->ex_anon_gid;
+
+	set_groups(new, gi);
+	put_group_info(gi);
+
+	if (!uid_eq(new->fsuid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID))
+		new->cap_effective = cap_drop_nfsd_set(new->cap_effective);
+	else
+		new->cap_effective = cap_raise_nfsd_set(new->cap_effective,
+							new->cap_permitted);
+	put_cred(override_creds(new));
+	return 0;
+
+oom:
+	abort_creds(new);
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+/**
+ * nfsd_user_namespace - Get user_namespace in effect for an RPC request
+ * @rqstp: RPC execution context
+ *
+ * xpt_cred is set once at transport creation and never modified. The
+ * transport itself is reference-counted during request processing, so
+ * no explicit reference on the namespace is necessary.
+ *
+ * Return: the user_namespace from the transport credential, or
+ * init_user_ns if no credential was set. The returned namespace pointer
+ * is valid for the duration of the RPC request.
+ */
+struct user_namespace *nfsd_user_namespace(const struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_cred;
+
+	return cred ? cred->user_ns : &init_user_ns;
+}