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| author | Xie Yuanbin <xieyuanbin1@huawei.com> | 2026-07-28 03:16:42 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> | 2026-08-05 16:15:51 +0100 |
| commit | 1039bffd6ae9c75b42b7d148d6c1106134107b66 (patch) | |
| tree | e8ee4ac80f87e2ad1b6b0c877eccbb62b0915c02 /fs/kernel_read_file.c | |
| download | linux-stable-1039bffd6ae9c75b42b7d148d6c1106134107b66.tar.gz linux-stable-1039bffd6ae9c75b42b7d148d6c1106134107b66.zip | |
ARM: 9485/1: mm: acquire mmap write lock around show_pte() for user faultsgrafted
When CONFIG_DEBUG_USER=y, and cmdline "user_debug=31" is set,
a user fault may trigger show_pte() without any lock.
If another thread in the same process concurrently calls munmap(),
the page table pages may be freed while show_pte() is still traversing
them, causing a use-after-free in show_pte().
If CONFIG_ARM_LPAE=y, this may cause a kernel panic if the pages table
of PMD are freed when show_pte() is running.
Acquire mmap_write_lock() around show_pte() for user faults to fix the
contention.
For user faults, additionally restrict that show_pte() is called only
when the addr is a user-space address (addr < TASK_SIZE). This is because
the lock of tsk->mm only protects the virtual memory of user address space,
furthermore, dumping the page tables of a kernel-space address for user
faults is unnecessary and may have security implications.
Keep everything unchanged for kernel faults, because the kernel is
already in the "oops" state, acquiring a lock may risk a deadlock.
Co-developed-by: Qi Xi <xiqi2@huawei.com>
Fixes: 6d021b724481 ("ARM: dump pgd, pmd and pte states on unhandled data abort faults")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260716014022.2823-1-xieyuanbin1@huawei.com
Acked-by: Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM) <ljs@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linusw@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Qi Xi <xiqi2@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Xie Yuanbin <xieyuanbin1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/kernel_read_file.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/kernel_read_file.c | 185 |
1 files changed, 185 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/kernel_read_file.c b/fs/kernel_read_file.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..de32c95d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/kernel_read_file.c @@ -0,0 +1,185 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +#include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/fs_struct.h> +#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h> +#include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/vmalloc.h> + +/** + * kernel_read_file() - read file contents into a kernel buffer + * + * @file: file to read from + * @offset: where to start reading from (see below). + * @buf: pointer to a "void *" buffer for reading into (if + * *@buf is NULL, a buffer will be allocated, and + * @buf_size will be ignored) + * @buf_size: size of buf, if already allocated. If @buf not + * allocated, this is the largest size to allocate. + * @file_size: if non-NULL, the full size of @file will be + * written here. + * @id: the kernel_read_file_id identifying the type of + * file contents being read (for LSMs to examine) + * + * @offset must be 0 unless both @buf and @file_size are non-NULL + * (i.e. the caller must be expecting to read partial file contents + * via an already-allocated @buf, in at most @buf_size chunks, and + * will be able to determine when the entire file was read by + * checking @file_size). This isn't a recommended way to read a + * file, though, since it is possible that the contents might + * change between calls to kernel_read_file(). + * + * Returns number of bytes read (no single read will be bigger + * than SSIZE_MAX), or negative on error. + * + */ +ssize_t kernel_read_file(struct file *file, loff_t offset, void **buf, + size_t buf_size, size_t *file_size, + enum kernel_read_file_id id) +{ + loff_t i_size, pos; + ssize_t copied; + void *allocated = NULL; + bool whole_file; + int ret; + + if (offset != 0 && (!*buf || !file_size)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode)) + return -EINVAL; + + ret = deny_write_access(file); + if (ret) + return ret; + + i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file)); + if (i_size <= 0) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + /* The file is too big for sane activities. */ + if (i_size > SSIZE_MAX) { + ret = -EFBIG; + goto out; + } + /* The entire file cannot be read in one buffer. */ + if (!file_size && offset == 0 && i_size > buf_size) { + ret = -EFBIG; + goto out; + } + + whole_file = (offset == 0 && i_size <= buf_size); + ret = security_kernel_read_file(file, id, whole_file); + if (ret) + goto out; + + if (file_size) + *file_size = i_size; + + if (!*buf) + *buf = allocated = vmalloc(i_size); + if (!*buf) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + pos = offset; + copied = 0; + while (copied < buf_size) { + ssize_t bytes; + size_t wanted = min_t(size_t, buf_size - copied, + i_size - pos); + + bytes = kernel_read(file, *buf + copied, wanted, &pos); + if (bytes < 0) { + ret = bytes; + goto out_free; + } + + if (bytes == 0) + break; + copied += bytes; + } + + if (whole_file) { + if (pos != i_size) { + ret = -EIO; + goto out_free; + } + + ret = security_kernel_post_read_file(file, *buf, i_size, id); + } + +out_free: + if (ret < 0) { + if (allocated) { + vfree(*buf); + *buf = NULL; + } + } + +out: + allow_write_access(file); + return ret == 0 ? copied : ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file); + +ssize_t kernel_read_file_from_path(const char *path, loff_t offset, void **buf, + size_t buf_size, size_t *file_size, + enum kernel_read_file_id id) +{ + struct file *file; + ssize_t ret; + + if (!path || !*path) + return -EINVAL; + + file = filp_open(path, O_RDONLY, 0); + if (IS_ERR(file)) + return PTR_ERR(file); + + ret = kernel_read_file(file, offset, buf, buf_size, file_size, id); + fput(file); + return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_path); + +ssize_t kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(const char *path, loff_t offset, + void **buf, size_t buf_size, + size_t *file_size, + enum kernel_read_file_id id) +{ + struct file *file; + struct path root; + ssize_t ret; + + if (!path || !*path) + return -EINVAL; + + task_lock(&init_task); + get_fs_root(init_task.fs, &root); + task_unlock(&init_task); + + file = file_open_root(&root, path, O_RDONLY, 0); + path_put(&root); + if (IS_ERR(file)) + return PTR_ERR(file); + + ret = kernel_read_file(file, offset, buf, buf_size, file_size, id); + fput(file); + return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_path_initns); + +ssize_t kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd, loff_t offset, void **buf, + size_t buf_size, size_t *file_size, + enum kernel_read_file_id id) +{ + CLASS(fd, f)(fd); + + if (fd_empty(f) || !(fd_file(f)->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) + return -EBADF; + + return kernel_read_file(fd_file(f), offset, buf, buf_size, file_size, id); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_fd); |
