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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /fs/hpfs/dentry.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/hpfs/dentry.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/hpfs/dentry.c | 62 |
1 files changed, 62 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/hpfs/dentry.c b/fs/hpfs/dentry.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..89a36fdc6 --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/hpfs/dentry.c @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * linux/fs/hpfs/dentry.c + * + * Mikulas Patocka (mikulas@artax.karlin.mff.cuni.cz), 1998-1999 + * + * dcache operations + */ + +#include "hpfs_fn.h" + +/* + * Note: the dentry argument is the parent dentry. + */ + +static int hpfs_hash_dentry(const struct dentry *dentry, struct qstr *qstr) +{ + unsigned long hash; + int i; + unsigned l = qstr->len; + + if (l == 1) if (qstr->name[0]=='.') goto x; + if (l == 2) if (qstr->name[0]=='.' || qstr->name[1]=='.') goto x; + hpfs_adjust_length(qstr->name, &l); + /*if (hpfs_chk_name(qstr->name,&l))*/ + /*return -ENAMETOOLONG;*/ + /*return -ENOENT;*/ + x: + + hash = init_name_hash(dentry); + for (i = 0; i < l; i++) + hash = partial_name_hash(hpfs_upcase(hpfs_sb(dentry->d_sb)->sb_cp_table,qstr->name[i]), hash); + qstr->hash = end_name_hash(hash); + + return 0; +} + +static int hpfs_compare_dentry(const struct dentry *dentry, + unsigned int len, const char *str, const struct qstr *name) +{ + unsigned al = len; + unsigned bl = name->len; + + hpfs_adjust_length(str, &al); + /*hpfs_adjust_length(b->name, &bl);*/ + + /* + * 'str' is the nane of an already existing dentry, so the name + * must be valid. 'name' must be validated first. + */ + + if (hpfs_chk_name(name->name, &bl)) + return 1; + if (hpfs_compare_names(dentry->d_sb, str, al, name->name, bl, 0)) + return 1; + return 0; +} + +const struct dentry_operations hpfs_dentry_operations = { + .d_hash = hpfs_hash_dentry, + .d_compare = hpfs_compare_dentry, +}; |
