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authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /fs/hpfs/dentry.c
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/hpfs/dentry.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/hpfs/dentry.c62
1 files changed, 62 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/hpfs/dentry.c b/fs/hpfs/dentry.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..89a36fdc6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/hpfs/dentry.c
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * linux/fs/hpfs/dentry.c
+ *
+ * Mikulas Patocka (mikulas@artax.karlin.mff.cuni.cz), 1998-1999
+ *
+ * dcache operations
+ */
+
+#include "hpfs_fn.h"
+
+/*
+ * Note: the dentry argument is the parent dentry.
+ */
+
+static int hpfs_hash_dentry(const struct dentry *dentry, struct qstr *qstr)
+{
+ unsigned long hash;
+ int i;
+ unsigned l = qstr->len;
+
+ if (l == 1) if (qstr->name[0]=='.') goto x;
+ if (l == 2) if (qstr->name[0]=='.' || qstr->name[1]=='.') goto x;
+ hpfs_adjust_length(qstr->name, &l);
+ /*if (hpfs_chk_name(qstr->name,&l))*/
+ /*return -ENAMETOOLONG;*/
+ /*return -ENOENT;*/
+ x:
+
+ hash = init_name_hash(dentry);
+ for (i = 0; i < l; i++)
+ hash = partial_name_hash(hpfs_upcase(hpfs_sb(dentry->d_sb)->sb_cp_table,qstr->name[i]), hash);
+ qstr->hash = end_name_hash(hash);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int hpfs_compare_dentry(const struct dentry *dentry,
+ unsigned int len, const char *str, const struct qstr *name)
+{
+ unsigned al = len;
+ unsigned bl = name->len;
+
+ hpfs_adjust_length(str, &al);
+ /*hpfs_adjust_length(b->name, &bl);*/
+
+ /*
+ * 'str' is the nane of an already existing dentry, so the name
+ * must be valid. 'name' must be validated first.
+ */
+
+ if (hpfs_chk_name(name->name, &bl))
+ return 1;
+ if (hpfs_compare_names(dentry->d_sb, str, al, name->name, bl, 0))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+const struct dentry_operations hpfs_dentry_operations = {
+ .d_hash = hpfs_hash_dentry,
+ .d_compare = hpfs_compare_dentry,
+};