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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /fs/hfsplus/ioctl.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/hfsplus/ioctl.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/hfsplus/ioctl.c70
1 files changed, 70 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/hfsplus/ioctl.c b/fs/hfsplus/ioctl.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..40d04dba1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/hfsplus/ioctl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * linux/fs/hfsplus/ioctl.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003
+ * Ethan Benson <erbenson@alaska.net>
+ * partially derived from linux/fs/ext2/ioctl.c
+ * Copyright (C) 1993, 1994, 1995
+ * Remy Card (card@masi.ibp.fr)
+ * Laboratoire MASI - Institut Blaise Pascal
+ * Universite Pierre et Marie Curie (Paris VI)
+ *
+ * hfsplus ioctls
+ */
+
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include "hfsplus_fs.h"
+
+/*
+ * "Blessing" an HFS+ filesystem writes metadata to the superblock informing
+ * the platform firmware which file to boot from
+ */
+static int hfsplus_ioctl_bless(struct file *file, int __user *user_flags)
+{
+ struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
+ struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
+ struct hfsplus_sb_info *sbi = HFSPLUS_SB(inode->i_sb);
+ struct hfsplus_vh *vh = sbi->s_vhdr;
+ struct hfsplus_vh *bvh = sbi->s_backup_vhdr;
+ u32 cnid = (unsigned long)dentry->d_fsdata;
+
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ mutex_lock(&sbi->vh_mutex);
+
+ /* Directory containing the bootable system */
+ vh->finder_info[0] = bvh->finder_info[0] =
+ cpu_to_be32(d_parent_ino(dentry));
+
+ /*
+ * Bootloader. Just using the inode here breaks in the case of
+ * hard links - the firmware wants the ID of the hard link file,
+ * but the inode points at the indirect inode
+ */
+ vh->finder_info[1] = bvh->finder_info[1] = cpu_to_be32(cnid);
+
+ /* Per spec, the OS X system folder - same as finder_info[0] here */
+ vh->finder_info[5] = bvh->finder_info[5] =
+ cpu_to_be32(d_parent_ino(dentry));
+
+ mutex_unlock(&sbi->vh_mutex);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+long hfsplus_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
+{
+ void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case HFSPLUS_IOC_BLESS:
+ return hfsplus_ioctl_bless(file, argp);
+ default:
+ return -ENOTTY;
+ }
+}