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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /fs/hfsplus/ioctl.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/hfsplus/ioctl.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/hfsplus/ioctl.c | 70 |
1 files changed, 70 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/hfsplus/ioctl.c b/fs/hfsplus/ioctl.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..40d04dba1 --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/hfsplus/ioctl.c @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * linux/fs/hfsplus/ioctl.c + * + * Copyright (C) 2003 + * Ethan Benson <erbenson@alaska.net> + * partially derived from linux/fs/ext2/ioctl.c + * Copyright (C) 1993, 1994, 1995 + * Remy Card (card@masi.ibp.fr) + * Laboratoire MASI - Institut Blaise Pascal + * Universite Pierre et Marie Curie (Paris VI) + * + * hfsplus ioctls + */ + +#include <linux/capability.h> +#include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/mount.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/uaccess.h> +#include "hfsplus_fs.h" + +/* + * "Blessing" an HFS+ filesystem writes metadata to the superblock informing + * the platform firmware which file to boot from + */ +static int hfsplus_ioctl_bless(struct file *file, int __user *user_flags) +{ + struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry; + struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); + struct hfsplus_sb_info *sbi = HFSPLUS_SB(inode->i_sb); + struct hfsplus_vh *vh = sbi->s_vhdr; + struct hfsplus_vh *bvh = sbi->s_backup_vhdr; + u32 cnid = (unsigned long)dentry->d_fsdata; + + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + mutex_lock(&sbi->vh_mutex); + + /* Directory containing the bootable system */ + vh->finder_info[0] = bvh->finder_info[0] = + cpu_to_be32(d_parent_ino(dentry)); + + /* + * Bootloader. Just using the inode here breaks in the case of + * hard links - the firmware wants the ID of the hard link file, + * but the inode points at the indirect inode + */ + vh->finder_info[1] = bvh->finder_info[1] = cpu_to_be32(cnid); + + /* Per spec, the OS X system folder - same as finder_info[0] here */ + vh->finder_info[5] = bvh->finder_info[5] = + cpu_to_be32(d_parent_ino(dentry)); + + mutex_unlock(&sbi->vh_mutex); + return 0; +} + +long hfsplus_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) +{ + void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg; + + switch (cmd) { + case HFSPLUS_IOC_BLESS: + return hfsplus_ioctl_bless(file, argp); + default: + return -ENOTTY; + } +} |
