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| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /fs/gfs2/acl.c | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/gfs2/acl.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/gfs2/acl.c | 148 |
1 files changed, 148 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/gfs2/acl.c b/fs/gfs2/acl.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a5b60778b --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/gfs2/acl.c @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Copyright (C) Sistina Software, Inc. 1997-2003 All rights reserved. + * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/spinlock.h> +#include <linux/completion.h> +#include <linux/buffer_head.h> +#include <linux/xattr.h> +#include <linux/posix_acl.h> +#include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h> +#include <linux/gfs2_ondisk.h> + +#include "gfs2.h" +#include "incore.h" +#include "acl.h" +#include "xattr.h" +#include "glock.h" +#include "inode.h" +#include "meta_io.h" +#include "quota.h" +#include "rgrp.h" +#include "trans.h" +#include "util.h" + +static const char *gfs2_acl_name(int type) +{ + switch (type) { + case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS: + return XATTR_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS; + case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT: + return XATTR_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT; + } + return NULL; +} + +static struct posix_acl *__gfs2_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type) +{ + struct gfs2_inode *ip = GFS2_I(inode); + struct posix_acl *acl; + const char *name; + char *data; + int len; + + if (!ip->i_eattr) + return NULL; + + name = gfs2_acl_name(type); + len = gfs2_xattr_acl_get(ip, name, &data); + if (len <= 0) + return ERR_PTR(len); + acl = posix_acl_from_xattr(&init_user_ns, data, len); + kfree(data); + return acl; +} + +struct posix_acl *gfs2_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type, bool rcu) +{ + struct gfs2_inode *ip = GFS2_I(inode); + struct gfs2_holder gh; + bool need_unlock = false; + struct posix_acl *acl; + + if (rcu) + return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD); + + if (!gfs2_glock_is_locked_by_me(ip->i_gl)) { + int ret = gfs2_glock_nq_init(ip->i_gl, LM_ST_SHARED, + LM_FLAG_ANY, &gh); + if (ret) + return ERR_PTR(ret); + need_unlock = true; + } + acl = __gfs2_get_acl(inode, type); + if (need_unlock) + gfs2_glock_dq_uninit(&gh); + return acl; +} + +int __gfs2_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type) +{ + int error; + size_t len = 0; + char *data = NULL; + const char *name = gfs2_acl_name(type); + + if (acl) { + data = posix_acl_to_xattr(&init_user_ns, acl, &len, GFP_NOFS); + if (data == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + } + + error = __gfs2_xattr_set(inode, name, data, len, 0, GFS2_EATYPE_SYS); + if (error) + goto out; + set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl); +out: + kfree(data); + return error; +} + +int gfs2_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + struct posix_acl *acl, int type) +{ + struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); + struct gfs2_inode *ip = GFS2_I(inode); + struct gfs2_holder gh; + bool need_unlock = false; + int ret; + umode_t mode; + + if (acl && acl->a_count > GFS2_ACL_MAX_ENTRIES(GFS2_SB(inode))) + return -E2BIG; + + ret = gfs2_qa_get(ip); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (!gfs2_glock_is_locked_by_me(ip->i_gl)) { + ret = gfs2_glock_nq_init(ip->i_gl, LM_ST_EXCLUSIVE, 0, &gh); + if (ret) + goto out; + need_unlock = true; + } + + mode = inode->i_mode; + if (type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS && acl) { + ret = posix_acl_update_mode(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode, &mode, &acl); + if (ret) + goto unlock; + } + + ret = __gfs2_set_acl(inode, acl, type); + if (!ret && mode != inode->i_mode) { + inode_set_ctime_current(inode); + inode->i_mode = mode; + mark_inode_dirty(inode); + } +unlock: + if (need_unlock) + gfs2_glock_dq_uninit(&gh); +out: + gfs2_qa_put(ip); + return ret; +} |
