summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/fs/fuse/sysctl.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /fs/fuse/sysctl.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/fuse/sysctl.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/fuse/sysctl.c65
1 files changed, 65 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/fuse/sysctl.c b/fs/fuse/sysctl.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..74eca5ce9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/fuse/sysctl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * linux/fs/fuse/fuse_sysctl.c
+ *
+ * Sysctl interface to fuse parameters
+ */
+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
+
+#include "sysctl.h"
+#include "fuse_i.h"
+
+static struct ctl_table_header *fuse_table_header;
+
+/* Bound by fuse_init_out max_pages, which is a u16 */
+static unsigned int sysctl_fuse_max_pages_limit = 65535;
+
+/*
+ * fuse_init_out request timeouts are u16.
+ * This goes up to ~18 hours, which is plenty for a timeout.
+ */
+static unsigned int sysctl_fuse_req_timeout_limit = 65535;
+
+static const struct ctl_table fuse_sysctl_table[] = {
+ {
+ .procname = "max_pages_limit",
+ .data = &fuse_max_pages_limit,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(fuse_max_pages_limit),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = proc_douintvec_minmax,
+ .extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE,
+ .extra2 = &sysctl_fuse_max_pages_limit,
+ },
+ {
+ .procname = "default_request_timeout",
+ .data = &fuse_default_req_timeout,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(fuse_default_req_timeout),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = proc_douintvec_minmax,
+ .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
+ .extra2 = &sysctl_fuse_req_timeout_limit,
+ },
+ {
+ .procname = "max_request_timeout",
+ .data = &fuse_max_req_timeout,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(fuse_max_req_timeout),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = proc_douintvec_minmax,
+ .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
+ .extra2 = &sysctl_fuse_req_timeout_limit,
+ },
+};
+
+int fuse_sysctl_register(void)
+{
+ fuse_table_header = register_sysctl("fs/fuse", fuse_sysctl_table);
+ if (!fuse_table_header)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void fuse_sysctl_unregister(void)
+{
+ unregister_sysctl_table(fuse_table_header);
+ fuse_table_header = NULL;
+}