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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /fs/fuse/sysctl.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/fuse/sysctl.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/fuse/sysctl.c | 65 |
1 files changed, 65 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/fuse/sysctl.c b/fs/fuse/sysctl.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..74eca5ce9 --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/fuse/sysctl.c @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * linux/fs/fuse/fuse_sysctl.c + * + * Sysctl interface to fuse parameters + */ +#include <linux/sysctl.h> + +#include "sysctl.h" +#include "fuse_i.h" + +static struct ctl_table_header *fuse_table_header; + +/* Bound by fuse_init_out max_pages, which is a u16 */ +static unsigned int sysctl_fuse_max_pages_limit = 65535; + +/* + * fuse_init_out request timeouts are u16. + * This goes up to ~18 hours, which is plenty for a timeout. + */ +static unsigned int sysctl_fuse_req_timeout_limit = 65535; + +static const struct ctl_table fuse_sysctl_table[] = { + { + .procname = "max_pages_limit", + .data = &fuse_max_pages_limit, + .maxlen = sizeof(fuse_max_pages_limit), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_douintvec_minmax, + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE, + .extra2 = &sysctl_fuse_max_pages_limit, + }, + { + .procname = "default_request_timeout", + .data = &fuse_default_req_timeout, + .maxlen = sizeof(fuse_default_req_timeout), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_douintvec_minmax, + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, + .extra2 = &sysctl_fuse_req_timeout_limit, + }, + { + .procname = "max_request_timeout", + .data = &fuse_max_req_timeout, + .maxlen = sizeof(fuse_max_req_timeout), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_douintvec_minmax, + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, + .extra2 = &sysctl_fuse_req_timeout_limit, + }, +}; + +int fuse_sysctl_register(void) +{ + fuse_table_header = register_sysctl("fs/fuse", fuse_sysctl_table); + if (!fuse_table_header) + return -ENOMEM; + return 0; +} + +void fuse_sysctl_unregister(void) +{ + unregister_sysctl_table(fuse_table_header); + fuse_table_header = NULL; +} |
