staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 99 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/fs/fuse/req.c b/fs/fuse/req.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a01ee743d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/fuse/req.c
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+
+#include "dev.h"
+#include "fuse_i.h"
+
+static int fuse_fill_creds(struct fuse_mount *fm, struct fuse_args *args, struct mnt_idmap *idmap)
+{
+	struct fuse_conn *fc = fm->fc;
+	bool no_idmap = !fm->sb || (fm->sb->s_iflags & SB_I_NOIDMAP);
+	kuid_t fsuid = mapped_fsuid(idmap, fc->user_ns);
+	kgid_t fsgid = mapped_fsgid(idmap, fc->user_ns);
+
+	args->pid = pid_nr_ns(task_pid(current), fc->pid_ns);
+
+	if (args->force) {
+		if (args->nocreds)
+			return 0;
+
+		if (no_idmap) {
+			args->uid = from_kuid_munged(fc->user_ns, current_fsuid());
+			args->gid = from_kgid_munged(fc->user_ns, current_fsgid());
+		} else {
+			args->uid = FUSE_INVALID_UIDGID;
+			args->gid = FUSE_INVALID_UIDGID;
+		}
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	WARN_ON(args->nocreds);
+	/*
+	 * Keep the old behavior when idmappings support was not
+	 * declared by a FUSE server.
+	 *
+	 * For those FUSE servers who support idmapped mounts, we send UID/GID
+	 * only along with "inode creation" fuse requests, otherwise idmap ==
+	 * &invalid_mnt_idmap and req->in.h.{u,g}id will be equal to
+	 * FUSE_INVALID_UIDGID.
+	 */
+	if (no_idmap) {
+		fsuid = current_fsuid();
+		fsgid = current_fsgid();
+	}
+	args->uid = from_kuid(fc->user_ns, fsuid);
+	args->gid = from_kgid(fc->user_ns, fsgid);
+
+	if (no_idmap && unlikely(args->uid == ((uid_t)-1) || args->gid == ((gid_t)-1)))
+		return -EOVERFLOW;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int fuse_req_prep(struct fuse_mount *fm, struct fuse_args *args, struct mnt_idmap *idmap)
+{
+	if (!args->force && fm->fc->conn_error)
+		return -ECONNREFUSED;
+
+	return fuse_fill_creds(fm, args, idmap);
+}
+
+ssize_t __fuse_simple_request(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct fuse_mount *fm,
+			      struct fuse_args *args)
+{
+	struct fuse_conn *fc = fm->fc;
+	int err = fuse_req_prep(fm, args, idmap);
+
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	return fuse_chan_send(fc->chan, args);
+}
+
+int fuse_simple_background(struct fuse_mount *fm, struct fuse_args *args, gfp_t gfp_flags)
+{
+	struct fuse_conn *fc = fm->fc;
+	int err;
+
+	WARN_ON(args->force && !args->nocreds);
+
+	err = fuse_req_prep(fm, args, &invalid_mnt_idmap);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	return fuse_chan_send_bg(fc->chan, args, gfp_flags);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fuse_simple_background);
+
+int fuse_simple_notify_reply(struct fuse_mount *fm, struct fuse_args *args, u64 unique)
+{
+	struct fuse_conn *fc = fm->fc;
+	int err;
+
+	WARN_ON(args->force && !args->nocreds);
+
+	err = fuse_req_prep(fm, args, &invalid_mnt_idmap);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	return fuse_chan_send_notify_reply(fc->chan, args, unique);
+}