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| author | Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com> | 2026-08-22 19:22:05 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org> | 2026-09-09 17:51:44 +0530 |
| commit | e873c74132f0c5f1452816cd9bb26208f0bba1e1 (patch) | |
| tree | cc1ce1567f5b982359331863ebd9da38741f8d2e /fs/fuse/acl.c | |
| download | linux-stable-e873c74132f0c5f1452816cd9bb26208f0bba1e1.tar.gz linux-stable-e873c74132f0c5f1452816cd9bb26208f0bba1e1.zip | |
dmaengine: fix use-after-free in dma_chan_put() and dma_release_channel()grafted
When dma_device_put() drops the last reference on chan->device->ref,
dma_device_release() runs and may free the dma_device along with its
channels.
dma_chan_put() then still reads chan->device->owner via
dma_chan_to_owner() for the trailing module_put(). KASAN catches it:
slab-use-after-free in dma_chan_put+0x3e6/0x4c0
Read of size 8 by task insmod/6319
Freed by task 6319:
kfree+0x225/0x470
dma_chan_put+0x395/0x4c0
dmaengine_put+0xf8/0x160
Cache the module owner in dma_chan_put() before the put so the trailing
module_put() does not need chan->device.
Fixes: 8ad342a86359 ("dmaengine: Add reference counting to dma_device struct")
Suggested-by: Sashiko <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260518-dmaengine-kref-fix-v1-1-4d6125048fb7@amd.com
Reviewed-by: Frank Li <Frank.Li@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Logan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com>
Signed-off-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260822-dmaengine-kref-fix-v5-3-d4a4ee47d927@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/fuse/acl.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/fuse/acl.c | 161 |
1 files changed, 161 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/fuse/acl.c b/fs/fuse/acl.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..31fb50e16 --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/fuse/acl.c @@ -0,0 +1,161 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * FUSE: Filesystem in Userspace + * Copyright (C) 2016 Canonical Ltd. <seth.forshee@canonical.com> + */ + +#include "fuse_i.h" + +#include <linux/posix_acl.h> +#include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h> + +static struct posix_acl *__fuse_get_acl(struct fuse_conn *fc, + struct inode *inode, int type, bool rcu) +{ + int size; + const char *name; + void *value = NULL; + struct posix_acl *acl; + + if (rcu) + return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD); + + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) + return ERR_PTR(-EIO); + + if (fc->no_getxattr) + return NULL; + + if (type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS) + name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS; + else if (type == ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT) + name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT; + else + return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP); + + value = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!value) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + size = fuse_getxattr(inode, name, value, PAGE_SIZE); + if (size > 0) + acl = posix_acl_from_xattr(fc->user_ns, value, size); + else if ((size == 0) || (size == -ENODATA) || + (size == -EOPNOTSUPP && fc->no_getxattr)) + acl = NULL; + else if (size == -ERANGE) + acl = ERR_PTR(-E2BIG); + else + acl = ERR_PTR(size); + + kfree(value); + return acl; +} + +static inline bool fuse_no_acl(const struct fuse_conn *fc, + const struct inode *inode) +{ + /* + * Refuse interacting with POSIX ACLs for daemons that + * don't support FUSE_POSIX_ACL and are not mounted on + * the host to retain backwards compatibility. + */ + return !fc->posix_acl && (i_user_ns(inode) != &init_user_ns); +} + +struct posix_acl *fuse_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, + struct dentry *dentry, int type) +{ + struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); + struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode); + + if (fuse_no_acl(fc, inode)) + return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP); + + return __fuse_get_acl(fc, inode, type, false); +} + +struct posix_acl *fuse_get_inode_acl(struct inode *inode, int type, bool rcu) +{ + struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode); + + /* + * FUSE daemons before FUSE_POSIX_ACL was introduced could get and set + * POSIX ACLs without them being used for permission checking by the + * vfs. Retain that behavior for backwards compatibility as there are + * filesystems that do all permission checking for acls in the daemon + * and not in the kernel. + */ + if (!fc->posix_acl) + return NULL; + return __fuse_get_acl(fc, inode, type, rcu); +} + +int fuse_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, + struct posix_acl *acl, int type) +{ + struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); + struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode); + const char *name; + int ret; + + if (fuse_is_bad(inode)) + return -EIO; + + if (fc->no_setxattr || fuse_no_acl(fc, inode)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + if (type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS) + name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS; + else if (type == ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT) + name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT; + else + return -EINVAL; + + if (acl) { + unsigned int extra_flags = 0; + /* + * Fuse userspace is responsible for updating access + * permissions in the inode, if needed. fuse_setxattr + * invalidates the inode attributes, which will force + * them to be refreshed the next time they are used, + * and it also updates i_ctime. + */ + size_t size; + void *value; + + value = posix_acl_to_xattr(fc->user_ns, acl, &size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!value) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (size > PAGE_SIZE) { + kfree(value); + return -E2BIG; + } + + /* + * Fuse daemons without FUSE_POSIX_ACL never changed the passed + * through POSIX ACLs. Such daemons don't expect setgid bits to + * be stripped. + */ + if (fc->posix_acl && + !in_group_or_capable(idmap, inode, + i_gid_into_vfsgid(idmap, inode))) + extra_flags |= FUSE_SETXATTR_ACL_KILL_SGID; + + ret = fuse_setxattr(inode, name, value, size, 0, extra_flags); + kfree(value); + } else { + ret = fuse_removexattr(inode, name); + } + + if (fc->posix_acl) { + /* + * Fuse daemons without FUSE_POSIX_ACL never cached POSIX ACLs + * and didn't invalidate attributes. Retain that behavior. + */ + forget_all_cached_acls(inode); + fuse_invalidate_attr(inode); + } + + return ret; +} |
